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Within the U.K. the crisis in the numbers of organs available for transplantation has featured strongly in the health care literature over the past five to ten years. Under the terms of the Human Tissues Act 1961 (166) many strategies to increase the number of available organs have been developed which hinge on the altruistic voluntary donation of organs via the “opt in” system. Critics of this system suggest that the current approach to organ procurement is inadequate, highlighting the growing gap between those waiting for a transplant and the numbers of organs available. In an effort to resolve this crisis they propose radical changes to the current legislation which would facilitate the adoption of an “opt –out”  or presumed consent system of organ donation. This approach, adopted by many European countries requires the registration of their objection to donation of their organs for transplant, by all individuals over the age of consent. Failure to register an objection would be interpreted therefore as an agreement to organ donation.
These proposed changes to the current organ donation legislation presents the health care professional with many legal, ethical and professional challenges. To date, little literature has been produced which explores the implications of presumed consent legislation for the health professional or individual within the Emergency or Intensive Care setting. This work evaluates the claims made for this approach to organ donation together with the implications for the professionals, patients and relatives of any change to presumed consent legislation. The key arguments in favour and against any changes to the current strategies are critically analysed and the implications for the health care professional and society considered. Central to the debate is the impact on these groups of the change from a voluntary based organ donation system to a system of mandatory removal of organs unless evidence of an objection can be demonstrated. 

 This work concludes that in order to resolve this crisis society has to debate one of two options. Society with the U.K. develops the considerable options for organ donation available under the provision of the Human Tissue Act 1961. This work explores these options. Fundamental to this approach however is the agreement that  the principle of voluntary donation of organs contained within the Act should be retained. Should this be accepted, this work suggests development of the current approaches to organ donation aimed at exploiting the opportunities of the present legislation. A critical evaluation of the benefits and consequences of this option is presented. Alternatively, should the debate produce an agreement that the principle of voluntary donation of organs be abolished with the adoption of presumed consent legislation, holds considerable implications for the professional and society as a whole. Any framework developed to implement such an initiative would require to address the legal, ethical, financial and professional impact of this legislation, providing appropriate safeguards for vulnerable groups at risk of harm from such legislation. Acknowledging these requirements this work proffers a framework for consideration that may facilitate the adoption of presumed consent legislation within the U.K.

Finally this work concludes that regardless of the option chosen in order to improve the supply of organs for transplantation, the strategies for organ donation within the U.K. require radical review in terms of the communication and organisational structures underpinning the current approaches.
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The United Kingdom Transplantation Support Service Authority (UKTSSA) reports that during the past decade initiatives to recruit individuals to donate their organs for transplantation, has identified 8 million people out of a population of 56 million willing to add their name to the NHS Organ Donor Register UKTSSA (184). A Gallup survey (2) of the population reported that 70% of those surveyed stated that they would donate their organs. This finding was supported by Gibson (62) and Gill and Hulatt (63) who also report between 70% and 90% of  those questioned respectively,  claimed that they would be willing to donate their organs. Despite these reports, each year since 1990, the number of solid organs made available for transplantation within this country has reduced by 18% Sweeny (154). During this time, deaths in the total population have also decreased, but by only 3% (6). Sweeny (154) suggests that these changes in mortality statistics might be possibly explained by the changes in the care of individuals who suffer a Road Traffic Accident or a Cerebral Vascular Accident. Improved survival rates in these conditions, which had previously resulted in high numbers of fatalities, have had a detrimental effect on the numbers of organs available for transplantation. Other factors including a drop in the numbers of people willing to donate their organs from 13.0 per 10,000 population in 1991 to 11.9 per 10,000 population in 1998 may have contributed to the shortage in the supply of organs for transplantation within the U.K. Currently, 7,033 individuals are on the waiting list for an organ transplantation, with a total of 3,528 transplantation operations being performed in 1999 (184). The gap between those waiting for a transplant and the numbers of organs available grows every year.

To resolve this increasing problem, the U.K. has developed medical, legal and ethical strategies that facilitate the donation of a human organ after death.  The donation of an organ is often viewed as a voluntary beneficent act undertaken by the individual with the intention of improving the health of another. It is viewed by most philosophies, save some particular religious faiths e.g. Orthodox Judaism as being acceptable and desirable. The majority of organs for donation are procured when an individual has agreed to offer his or her organs for donation following their death, described as cadaver donations. Alternatively, the individual can agree to offer to donate certain types of organs to another person while they are still alive, described as live donation. Within the U.K. the majority of solid organ donations are via the cadaver donation route and often only result in the obtaining of a single organ from a donor. According to the Human Tissue Act 1961 s 1 (1) (166) (here after referred to as the HTA1961) if an individual wishes to donate their organs they can volunteer to do this and notify the appropriate authorities of their intention. The HTA 1961 (166) allows the removal of an organ from the deceased for therapeutic, educational and research purposes if there is evidence of the specific request from the individual. Ward (192) discusses how in 1971 she introduced a system which allowed people to register their consent to this action via the carrying of an organ donor card which the individual would carry with them at all times. People who subscribed were also encouraged to notify their immediate family and friends of their decision. This “opt in” system allows the individual to choose to donate their organs and notify their intention to do this prior to their death.

In the absence of this individual request the HTA 1961  s 1(2) (166) facilitates the removal of an organ from the body for these purposes by the person “lawfully in possession of the body” provided that they have made “such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable” that the deceased did not object to this action or that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased does not object to the body being dealt with in this manner. Whilst the family have no power to disregard the freely given consent of the deceased to organ donation and therefore veto the decision to donate made by the deceased, Dimond (31) and Mason McCall-Smith (102) suggest that it is unlikely that any hospital would proceed with organ procurement, should the relatives object to this action. 

Sadly, these strategies continue to produce a considerable short fall in the number of organs required for transplantation. Some clinicians have attempted to explore the rationale for this by analysing the practice for organ procurement undertaken by health care professionals. Lack of evidence of the individual’s wish to donate their organs appears to result in many missed opportunities for organ donation. Lack of awareness of the issue by staff within the acute setting coupled with staff reluctance to request organ donation at the time of a sudden death also appear to influence donation rates. Some staff report considerable difficulties in exploring this delicate issue at a time of great distress for relatives. Gore et al, (66) suggests that in the U.K. seven out of every ten families approached about organ donation would give their consent. She also suggests that a 20% increase in cadaver donations could be achieved if avoidance of non - procurement by health care staff was addressed. The provision of improved professional skills in requesting donation she suggests might reduce relatives’ refusal of consent. Gibson (62) suggested that the non - procurement of organs is a much more complicated issue under the influence of many factors, not least the attitudes towards organ donation held by the public and the professionals involved. She suggests that underlying philosophies must be understood if the problem of shortage of organs is to be resolved.

Whilst the debate as to how we should improve relatives’ consent to remove organs continues, other European countries have adopted a more interactive approach. Belgium and Austria have a system designed to increase the number of organs available for transplantation, and relieve the relatives of the need to provide consent at this difficult and distressing time. These countries now operate an “opt-out system”, where by organs can be utilised for transplant from cadavers without the need to obtain the relatives’ consent. This presumed consent system requires the registration by all individuals over the age of consent, of their objection to donation of their organs for transplant. It is presumed that everyone is in agreement with the concept of organ donation. Failure to register an objection would be interpreted therefore as an agreement to this procedure. Roel (139) suggests that this has been successful in increasing the numbers of organs for transplantation in the counties who have introduced this system. Beecham (6) reports that the BMA passed a motion urging the government to amend the law relating to organ donation within the U.K. to facilitate the adoption of a similar system. 

Titmus (179) and Veatch, (189) however warn of the legal and ethical difficulties associated with this system, for example, conflict between the concept of an organ donation as a voluntary gift between one human being and another versus forced removal of organs irrespective of consent. Prottas and Batten (126) support this view suggesting that the principles of informed consent and encouraged voluntarism that underpin the act of organ donation are vital to the organ donation programme and cannot be overlooked. Gillion (64) and Wilks (197) suggest that the adoption of such an approach to organ donation could infringe the civil liberties of many, not least whose within society who may be unable to register their objection as a result of poor information or lack of understanding. They also suggest that these individuals might lose the right to determine what is to be done with their body after their death. This ability to control what is done to an individual’s body after death is viewed by many, as a fundamental tenet of respect for autonomy of the individual. Consent provided by default they argue is no consent at all and ethically unsustainable. Patel (123) reports an increase of refusal rates for organ donation from relatives following the introduction of presumed consent legislation in France, citing the public’s loss of confidence in the transplantation system since the introduction of this legislation as an explanation.

Organ donation presents the health care professional with many legal, ethical and professional challenges. To date little literature has been produced which explores the implications of presumed consent legislation for the health professional within the  Emergency or Intensive Care setting. The aim of this work is therefore to explore the legal, ethical and professional implications for the professionals, patients and relatives within this setting of any change to presumed consent legislation. The key arguments in favour and against any changes will analysed and the implications for the health care professional and society considered. The four main objectives of the work are :-

1.	Analyse the current legal and ethical frameworks that underpin the procurement and supply of organs for transplant in the U.K.
2.	Critically analyse Presumed Consent legislation currently utilised within certain European countries identifying the potential legal moral benefits and hazards this presents for the heath care professional and society.

3.	Explore the alternative initiatives currently undertaken to improve the procurement and supply of organs for transplant  within the U.K. and other countries





Chapter 2  Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in U.K.

A.	Existing law and the Cadaver Donor

Currently the main approach to organ transplantation is cadaver donation, where the individual can determine what they wish to have done with their body tissues following their death.  Prior to death an individual can validly consent to the removal of organs after their death for transplantation, education or scientific purposes both in common law and statutory law. This will facilitate cadaver organ donation.

(i) Common Law
 Dworkin (40) highlights how a corpse cannot ordinarily be the subject of ownership. The executor or the next of kin will have lawful possession of the body and has a duty to arrange for burial. He suggests that this gives rise to a person being unable to determine what shall happen to his body after his death, however, in most situations the wishes of the deceased are observed. 

(ii) Statute
The first statutory regulation of donation of cadaver tissues was framed within the Anatomy Act 1832 (157) passed as a result of the prosecution of Burke and Hare who supplied corpses for payment to medical schools in Edinburgh. This allowed a person to make a declaration donating their body to medical science following their death. The Corneal Grafting Act 1952 (160) allowed for the donation of eyes for therapeutic purposes and was closely followed by the H T A 1961 (166) (Appendix 1) which regulates the use of cadaver organs and tissues details the regulation of cadaver transplantation under the following five headings:-
a)	Ensuring that Life is Extinct

Under the terms of the HTA 1961 (166) the transplant surgeon must establish the death of the donor utilising accepted criteria. This may include the utilisation of brain stem death criteria to establish death. Brain stem death is said to occur when a person has sustained acute irreparable, structural damage to their brain usually the medulla oblongata (121). This produces a deeply comatose state without regulatory control of respiratory and cardiac functions and renders the patient unable to breath without the assistance of a ventilator. Should this assistance be provided the respiratory arrest and subsequent cardiac arrest which would follow from anoxia is prevented. These patients will never regain consciousness with their normal bodily functions requiring to be supported by medical technology. These patients are usually subject to testing of their brain stem function to establish if any of this vital aspect of the brain function remains. These brain stem death criteria (Appendix 2) have been recognised by the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and Faculties of the U.K. (19) as being sufficiently robust to demonstrate whether the patient with a severe brain injury retains any brain stem function. In the event of the brain stem function being permanently lost the patient is legally recognised as being dead but continues to have a cardiac output and respiration with the support of medical technology. The patient could therefore be described as a heart- beating cadaver. Controversy does exist however with acceptance of this terminology amongst health care professional as in Re A [1992] (132).

b) Authorisation to Remove Tissues

Under s1 (1) of the HTA 1961 (166) the removal of an organ is authorised, if there has been a specific request to this effect by the deceased prior to their death for therapeutic, educational and research purposes. The individual wishing to undertake this course of action usually does so by giving consent in writing prior to their death. This would indicate freely given consent to the use of any organs or tissue including the use of specific organs or tissues. This is commonly known as the “opting in” system where the individual makes known his or her willingness to be a donor.

c) Appropriate Indication of Wish to Become a Donor





The request must also have been made by a competent person, who has the capacity to make this decision. The required level of this comprehension has been described by Kennedy and Grubb (86) as being similar to that which one would require to make a valid will as held in Banks v Goodfellow [1870] by Cockburn C.J (4).:-
 
“ He ought to be capable of making his will with an understanding of the nature of the business in which he is engaged, a recollection of the property he means to be disposed of, of the persons who are the objects of his bounty, and the manner in which it is to be distributed between them. It is not necessary that he should view his will with the eye of a lawyer, and comprehend its provisions in their legal form. It is sufficient if he has such a mind and memory as will enable him to understand the elements of which it is composed, and the disposition of his property in its simple form”

 Kennedy and Grubb also suggest that a more up to date approach may be the comprehension level as suggested in ReK [1988] (135). In this case the power of attorney was valid if the donor understood the nature and effect of an enduring power of attorney notwithstanding that she was at the time of its execution incapable by reason of mental disorder of managing her property and affairs. Hoffman J. concluded that in principle, an understanding of the nature and effect of the power of the transaction was sufficient for its validity.  It could also be concluded that the standard tests for competence required for valid consent as held by Lord Brandon in F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] (52) would also apply in this situation. In addition, the request must also come from a person over the age of consent as suggested by the Wills Act 1831 (178), which is principally relevant in England and Wales but also applies in Scotland.

e) Authorisation to Proceed

In the absence of such a statement from the deceased, s 1(2) of the HTA 1961 (166) allows the removal of an organ for these purposes by the person lawfully in possession of the body at the time of death. This allows the lawful possessor of the body to proceed to organ donation, having first made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable to establish if the deceased has raised any objection to such an action. They are also required to establish that the deceased did not withdraw this request and whether any surviving spouse or any other surviving relative, objects to the removal of any organ or tissues. Having done so they can decide on the disposal of the corpse as they deem appropriate, respecting the sensitivities of any surviving relative.





B. Enforcement of the Human Tissue Act 1961

There are no specific penalties for breach of the HTA 1961 (166).  Skegg (147) therefore questions if there is an offence for non – observance of the terms of the statute suggesting that the removal of an organ to save the life of a recipient may be justified on the grounds of necessity. McHale et al., (107) challenges this highlighting the view held in R v Lennox Wright [1973] by Judge Lawson Q.C. (130) that:- 

“ If a statute prohibits a matter of public grievance to the liberties and securities of the subject or commands a matter of public convenience (such as repairing of highways or the like) all acts or omissions contrary to the prohibitions or commands of the statute are misdemeanours at common law punishable by indictment unless such method manifestly appears to be excluded by statute.”


This would suggest that any non – observance of the law in general terms may result in punishment under common law such as a prison sentence or fine. In this case a person who represented himself as a medical practitioner removed organs from a dead body, contrary to s 1(4) of the HTA 1961 (166) and was held to be guilty of disobedience of the statute, which was punishable under the act.  Kennedy (85) criticises this view suggesting that the court is unlikely to hold that a breach of a statute, which deals with the issue of liability and does not make conduct a criminal offence, would provide a criminal liability in common law. These differing views would suggest that there exists contention as to the application of the HTA 1961 (166) and the penalties which may result from non-enforcement. The main areas of contention in this debate are:-

a) Authority to Dispose of the Body

The wording of the HTA 1961 (166) has been criticised as being too vague which can result in differing interpretations of the terms specified within the legislation. The first example is the controversy that exists as to who has the authority to dispose of the body. Mason and McCall – Smith (102) suggest that the definition of the person in lawful possession of the body was formerly taken to refer to the person with the right to the body i.e. the deceased’s executors. Should the individual die whilst in hospital, in practical terms the person in lawful possession of the body is viewed by the legal profession and the British Medical Association to be the hospital administrator. They do point out however, that this has yet to be tested in court.

Other issues arise, such as, whether an individual can own a body or parts of a body and whether harm can be done to the corpse. Again a confusing picture emerges. Lanham (94) states that no harm can be done to a corpse as a result of unauthorised removal of tissues and there is no property interest in a corpse. Lanham also states that in general a dead body cannot be owned and cannot therefore be stolen.  The HTA 1961 (166), states that the person with the duty to dispose of the body has the right of possession for that purpose. Skegg (147) suggests that as a consequence of this unauthorised interference with the right of possession of the body, (for example, an unauthorised post mortem) would constitute trespass to the person. Mason and McCall – Smith (102) also suggest that the traditional view held by the English courts is that a third party i.e. the hospital authorities can own body parts but the person from whom these body parts have been taken cannot own them i.e. there is no property interest in a corpse as held in Dr. Handayside’s case (c18) (37) , 1 Hawk ; Williams v Williams [1882] (198) and R v Fox [1841] (128).   Mason and McCall- Smith (102) do state however there is authority in Scotland that property can exist in a corpse, at least until it is buried or disposed of as in Dewar v HM Advocate [1945] (30). The “no property rule” does have its limitations however as demonstrated in a subsequent case In R v Kelly[1998] (129).  

In Kelly (129) where anatomical specimens were taken by a technician without permission and later utilised by an artist, the question arose as to whether it is possible to steal body parts. The court of appeal held that these specimens were property and could be stolen. The court in this ruling acknowledged that there can be no property in a corpse at common law, but held that where work or skill had changed the attributes of the anatomical part, this could be viewed as someone’s property. To remove tissues without authority is therefore theft. In Kelly (129) the court quoted with approval a ruling in a previous Australian case Doodeward v Spence [1908] (34) where the court held that the next of kin have no legal right to possession of the body or body parts, unless they assume the role of executor or administrator in respect of the burial or disposal of the body. 

Mason & McCall - Smith (102) suggests that the ruling in Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1996] (32) had also supported this decision. In Dobson (32) an action for negligence brought by the family of the deceased against the health authority, the brain of the deceased was removed at autopsy under the Coroners Rules [1984] (162) to establish whether the cited cause of death a brain tumour was malignant or benign. At the completion of the autopsy the brain was disposed of following normal procedures.  The family subsequently brought a further action against the hospital alleging that it had converted property that the relatives were entitled to and that they had no authority to dispose of the tissue. The court of appeal later ruled that the family had no right of possession or ownership of the brain or the corpse unless they assume the role as executor or administrator.  In addition, the court held that property rights could arise in respect of body parts when some work or skill differentiates the body or its parts from a corpse in its natural state. How much work is required to be done to the tissue to confer property rights on the hospital is unclear. In the Dobson (32) case the brain had only been preserved in formaldehyde and had no “work” done to it. Mason and McCall–Smith (102) are of the view that this case taken with R v Kelly [1998] (129), creates the situation that property rights in body parts arise for the possessor of the tissue who intend to use the goods or tissues and not for the deceased or their families.  This ruling could have considerable implications for the departments of anatomy where tissues are held for educational or research purposes as these departments now have rights over the body parts in their possession. 

b) Right to Control Tissue

 There are also implications for patients and researchers who in the course of their professional practice, handle tissue taken from an individual. Judgements in the US have highlighted the need to consider the rights of individuals to exert control over the utilisation of any organ or tissue removed from their body during the course of medical treatment. In the case of Moore v Regents of University of California [1990] (111), the court ruled that the plaintiff in this case did not have the right to control what was done with the removed tissue. In this situation a patient had tissue and cells removed during medical procedures, which was subsequently used by the University to develop a commercial cell line. This cell line was later sold for research purposes without the knowledge or consent of the patient. This action for conversion against the medical staff, the University and the commercial company behind the research project failed as the judgement in the supreme court that held that the plaintiff had no ownership interests in his tissues after they were removed from his body. In contrast two other judges in this case Judge Mosk and Judge Broussard dissented strongly from this view, suggesting that the patient in the case was not informed of the purpose intended for his tissues and did not consent to its usage by the company. These judges in their consideration of the case questioned the situation that in their view had allowed the bio-technical company to exploit the patient and then escape liability. 
In acknowledging Moore (111), The Canadian Law Reform Commission (159) highlighted how the complex issues of informed consent, property interests and rights of health care professionals required further analysis to discover how society could best balance the need to protect human rights against the need to develop therapeutic advances.  

In the U.K. this issue has also been a topic of discussion. Grubb (67) suggests that the English common law has traditionally been reluctant to view body parts as property both as a description and as something which it is possible to have some control over. He suggests that in the light of the Human Fertility and Embryology Act 1990 (164) which suggests that human embryos should be characterised as the “property” of their genetic progenitors this view may be changing. As has been previously discussed rulings in Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1996] (32) and  R v Kelly [1998] (129) would support this view and the debate of property in body parts may yet produce some considerable discussions in the future.

c) Consent to Proceed from Coroner or Procurator Fiscal

In the event of a sudden death there is a requirement under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 (163) and Coroners Act 1988  (161) for the medical practitioner pronouncing the person as dead, to notify the local procurator fiscal or coroners office of the circumstances surrounding the death. He / She will then decide if any enquiry into the circumstances of the death and indeed if a post mortem examination of the body is required. Mason cited in Dyre (101) states that it is an offence to obstruct the coroner in the execution of his / her duties by the removal of organs without permission. Within the Home Secretary’s Circular 1977 (76) it is stressed however, that the Coroner should not place obstacles in the way of the development of medicine and science or take moral or ethical decisions in this matter. Brazier (10) suggests that in the event of a possible organ donation the coroner is urged to assist this procedure wherever possible.  In practice permission to proceed is usually granted, provided that the organ which has been requested for transplantion is not linked to the cause of the deceased’s death and would not be relevant to the coroner’s enquiry.

d) Tort or Liability Under the Act

i) Negligent Practice
In organ or tissue transplantation as with all other forms of treatment there is a duty of care owed to the person receiving the organ or tissues as held in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] (33). Should that duty of care be breached and the recipient of the organ be harmed by any negligent action by the health care professionals or other parties involved, an action under the law of tort may result as in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] (8). On this basis action can potentially arise against the donor of the organ or tissue should the recipient be harmed as a result of a transplant of tissue. Kennedy and Grubb (86) suggest that there is a growing body of law in the U.S. that may assist in future cases related to liability for the transmission of infections or other conditions. To illustrate this point Kennedy and Grubb (86) discuss cases where the donor’s duty to disclose any known genetic or infective condition which might make them unable to donate as in Kathleen K. v Robert B.         [1984] (83) .  In this case a woman sued her former boyfriend for infecting her with genital herpes. The case found in favour of the defendant citing the right to privacy as being paramount in his non-disclosure of this infective condition. This was later overturned by the District Court of Appeal that held that the defendant’s right to privacy was outweighed by the need to prevent and control contagious disease and found in favour of the plaintiff. In the U.S. courts therefore it has been established that there is a duty of care owed to the recipient of an organ or tissue by the donor to ensure that they do not knowingly transmit infection or disorder to the recipient. This duty of care however may be influenced by whether the donor knew s/he was carrying and infection or carrying a defective gene which would potentially harm the recipient. 

This view held by the U.S. court has not been upheld in the U.K. Recent approaches to establishing the duty of care owed to a recipient heard in the House of Lords suggest that the U.K. as yet is reluctant to recognise this duty and the resultant liability. In Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman {1990] (15) and Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] (112) action for negligence was instigated against the defendants alleging carelessness. Here the question as to whether there is a common law duty of care rested on the issue of whether the damage to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. If the damage was not reasonably foreseen then there is no duty of care. In the case of an organ or tissue donor if they were not aware that they were carrying an infection they could not reasonably be under a duty of care to disclose this information.  Kennedy and Grubb (86) suggest that even if a duty to disclose information can be established this may not be the crucial factor that results in the harm to the recipient of an organ or tissues. They suggest that the conduct of others involved in the care of any tissue may impact on the outcome, and so breaking the chain of causation. In this situation the action for negligence would fail. 

An action could also be brought by the donee against the doctor or the procurement agency alleging negligence in the carrying out of a procedure. In Re HIV Haemophiliac Litigation [1990] (134) the plaintiffs were patients who were infected with HIV from blood clotting products, sued the NHS for breach of their statutory duty of care under the terms of ss1 and 3(1) of the National Health Service Act 1997 (171) to promote a comprehensive heath service in England and Wales designed to secure improvements a) in physical and mental health of people and b) in the prevention , diagnosis and treatment of illness. The Court of Appeal held that it was impossible to say that the haemophiliacs involved did not have a case for negligence against the government however, as this case challenged government policy, they were of the view that this was a political matter, outwith the remit of the courts to determine. After much debate, this case was settled with the plaintiffs by the government and the arguments therefore remain unexplored. 

Reports that utilisation of organs from cadavers can potentially lead to the transmission of fatal viruses or other diseases have given rise to the further possibility of actions for negligence against the NHS. Ellis et al., (45) and Markus et al., (100) described the potential for pituitary glands removed from cadavers to develop growth hormone for children, to cause the transmission of Variant Creutzefeldt-Jakob Disease to these children. In the event of any organ being procured for transplantation the hospital authorities would be under a duty of care to ensure that the organ was suitable for transplant and free of disease. This is usually established by having an adequate history of the deceased’s medical condition prior to death, by having access to the deceased’s medical records or making enquiries of the surviving relatives during the request for organ donation. Failure to establish that the deceased was a suitable candidate for organ donation i.e. free of any infective conditions or transmittable genetic disorder may result in action against the authorities.

ii) Nervous Shock
Those relatives who felt that they were not consulted prior to the removal of organs for donation and suffered as a result could also potentially bring action for nervous shock.  Under section 1 (2) of the HTA 1961 (166) the person in legal possession of the body is charged making “reasonable enquiry as may be practicable” to establish an objection to the removal of organs for donation. Skegg (148) criticises these statements suggesting their vagueness allows for liberal interpretation depending on the time, manpower and resources available to undertake these enquiries. In the twenty first century with very different methods of communication at their disposal than those open to their colleagues in 1961, it is unclear as to what would be viewed as reasonable enquiry to establish any objection by the deceased or his / her family. Other references to statements such as “any surviving relative” also bring the HTA 1961 (166) into question.  Under these terms it is unclear if enquiries should be limited to the deceased’s current immediate family or should the views of estranged members be obtained before proceeding with the removal of the organs for therapeutic, educational or research purposes. A guidance health circular produced by the DHSS (26) advises that in reference to the enquires of surviving relatives:-

“In most instances it will be sufficient to discuss the matter with any one relative who had been in close contact with the deceased, asking him his views, the views of the deceased and also if he has any reason to believe that any other relative would be likely to object.”

It is envisaged that this would provide the health professional with sufficient information to verify the deceased’s wishes with respect to the disposal of his remains.

As previously discussed it has been established that under English law the relatives have no right of property in the corpse. Skegg (147) McHale et al., (107) concur however, that grounds to pursue an action for nervous shock are open to relatives who believe the conditions for reasonable enquiry have not been met, as in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] (195) and Janvier v Sweeny [1919] (79). They suggest however that establishing this claim would be difficult as one element of tort, the necessary intention to inflict harm, would be impossible to demonstrate. Theoretically, a spouse or close relative, could bring about an action for damages claiming negligence that resulted in psychiatric injury caused by mutilation of the body for the purposes of transplantation. McHale et al., (107) suggest that if it could be demonstrated that a recognisable psychiatric illness had been caused by distress of seeing a body after organ donation then this action may succeed. This would rest on the successful demonstration that the relative was in close proximity to the procedure to remove the organs and was harmed as a result, as held in Hambrook v Stokes [1925] (69). This view was supported by the court in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1991] (2) where the court recognised a bystanders claim for psychiatric injury if they were closely involved with a traumatic event. 

Applying this view to the removal of organs from a loved one without the knowledge of the relative would suggest that, the recovery of damages for nervous shock would fail if plaintiff learnt of the unauthorised removal from others after the event, in contrast to witnessing the removal or its consequences for him / herself. This view was upheld in a later case , McFadden v EE. Caledonian [1994] (106) when the court held that such a claim for nervous shock cannot be made by relatives if they have not been in close proximity to a traumatic event.

 Commentators suggest that the wording of the HTA 1961 (166) appears to establish a duty to make such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable. The duty within the act is not absolute, this would depend on the interpretation of reasonableness. Kennedy (85) suggests that if this duty was clarified then it would be possible to demonstrate that s 1(2) of the HTA 1961 (166) was designed to prevent psychiatric injury to relatives where tissue was removed without permission. The ambiguity surrounding this issue continues. Indeed, recent media reports relating to the disposal of body parts from children without their parent’s consent have re-ignited the debate on this issue. The parents suggest that they had not consented to the removal of their children’s organs for research and educational purposes merely by agreeing to post-mortem examinations on their children. The parents involved in this situation claim psychological distress on hearing the news that the organs of their dead children were retained within pathology departments and not buried with the corpse. Whilst this practice may appear to many as most distasteful and possibly unethical, it may be within the terms of the HTA 1961 (166) if it can be established that the accepted procedures for obtaining consent and inquiry of objections were undertaken. 

The Interim Report of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (11) explores this point further. The report suggests that under present legislation there is no requirement for the Coroner (or Procurator Fiscal in Scotland) investigating a child death to seek the consent of parents to utilise any human materials for therapeutic, educational or research purposes. It is enough that s/he ensures that the parents do not object to this action. The onus is on the parents to object not for the hospital to seek consent. The report team challenge this position suggesting that the HTA 1961 (166) does not respect the views or the needs of the parents at this distressing time. Furthermore, under the terms of the Coroners Act 1988 (161) if an inquiry into the death of the child is required then the remains become the property of the Coroner until the investigation is completed. The inquiry team also suggests that at the completion of the post mortem examination, the human material reverts back to the possession of the parents. Under these circumstances it is the duty of the Coroner to comply with the parents wishes to have all human material returned to them. The Inquiry team concluded that there is no legal justification for not placing the Coroner under a positive duty to inform the parents about the purposes of the Coroners post mortem examination and all that this entails. Should the suggestion that the HTA 1961 (166) does not pay appropriate regard to the needs of relatives in the cases related to the death of a child be upheld, it could be argued that this deficit in the law may equally apply to the consideration of relatives in the death of an adult. The debate may yet produce legal challenges to previous court rulings on this matter.

In summary, donation of organs for transplant is legally permitted both in common law and statutory law. Cadaver organ donation is currently the chief source of organs for transplantation within the U.K. Under the terms of the HTA 1961 (166) prior to their death, an individual can validly consent to the removal of their organs after death for transplantation, education and scientific purposes. There are conditions which require to be met however, such as the establishment of the patient’s death utilising accepted criteria, ascertaining that the deceased has validly consented to the removal of the organs and that the person in possession of the body at the time of death has the authority to sanction such a procedure. Once these conditions have been addressed the current legislation provides considerable flexibility to procure organs for transplant.

There are difficulties with the legislation however. In order to utilise the present legislation to its full potential a large number of the population is required to register to be organ donors, there is a clear requirement to improve the numbers of people willing to do so. This task is not as simple as it may seem. Public confidence in the scientific professions appears to be at a record low  (78).  Fears of the power that the medical and scientific professions hold over the individual may impact on the number of people who volunteer as organ donors. Measures to highlight the problem, reassure the pubic of their safety and recruit more people to volunteer are required. Despite the difficulties in achieving these aims no coherent strategy for resolving this problem appeared within the most recent review of health care policy within the U.K. (71). This position requires urgent review.

 The majority of health care professionals employed within the setting where organ donation is an option are in favour of organ donation. Provided with the correct environment and the appropriate circumstances most will attempt to procure organs for donation. Sadly, many opportunities to acquire organs are lost every year from cadaver donors which could be utilised either,  because the staff involved are unaware of the current powers afforded by the legislation to procure organs, or are reluctant to utilise this option as a result of practical, organisational or ethical difficulties which they perceive will arise from the attempt to procure organs for transplantation.
Confusion exists as to the extent of these enquiries and how any objection may be established. In the absence of a donor card providing consent or consent to proceed being established via the deceased’s name being present on the national organ donation register, the permission to proceed is usually achieved by a request made to relatives. In an anticipated death, for example, one that occurs in the hospital intensive care setting, although this may be a distressing obligation to fulfil this may be established with comparative ease. In a sudden death situation however, relatives may not be present therefore establishing the deceased’s or their objection may be difficult. Presented with these practical difficulties in ascertaining the deceased wishes, hospital staff often do not consider this option and the opportunity for organ donation is missed. 

Controversy also exists surrounding the need to undertake the practice of requesting consent from the immediate family to proceed to organ donation, even in the presence of legally recognised consent from the deceased. Kennedy et al., (84) are of the view that this is unnecessary under the present legislation given that prior consent from the deceased has been established. They also suggest that it would be beneficial to the relatives to remove the need to make a request at this distressing time. Mason and McCall-Smith (102) together with Galbraith (57) amongst others however are of the view, that the achievement of consent from the relatives to proceed to organ donation is essential from a professional and ethical perspective if not legally required under the current legislation. This role is both difficult and stressful for the staff and the relatives within the organ procurement situation and requires specialist education and communication skills to be undertaken effectively. Practical measures require to be undertaken to improve the likelihood of staff making this request of relatives if no prior consent of the deceased can be established. Improved access to information regarding the deceased’s wishes prior to death may reduce these perceived difficulties and may make staff more willing to explore this option. Currently the national organ donation register holds the names of 8 million people who are willing to be organ donors (184). Recruitment to this register relies on the knowledge and altruistic behaviour of individuals in society. Many members of the public have a poor understanding of the need for organ donation, of the existence of an organ donation register or how they might register their consent to this. If a national strategy to improve the numbers of people placing their names on this register could be undertaken coupled with a commitment to improve access to this data base for all relevant NHS trusts, this may allow the current legislation to be more effective. These measures would require a considerable financial and organisational undertaking from the Department of Health.  

Given that the professionals involved feel obliged to proceed with this request of the relatives to ensure no objection exists it would be logical to assume that the professional undertaking this request was suitably prepared for this difficult task. Strategies which would prepare the professional for this role might increase the frequency with which the task was undertaken.  Ideally, in order to obtain the best outcome in terms of successful consent rates and appropriate support of the relatives at this crucial time, this role would be undertaken by specially prepared transplant co-ordinators. Limited access to these professionals however results in the staff within the ITU and A&E environments having to undertake this role unsupported. Gore et al., (65) supports the view that lack of preparation and support in this task either produces reticence to undertake the role at all in many staff, or may influence the rates of refusal. Resources designed to improve the rate of requests of relatives to proceed to donation are urgently required. These include both an increase of the numbers of transplant co-ordinators available to make the request and the preparation of the ITU and A&E staff who may find themselves in the position of having to make the request should be urgently reviewed.  More specialist preparation for this role should be included in the education of medical and nursing staff working within these environments as a matter of urgency. 

Confusion appears to exist related to the level of information required to be provided to the relatives’ about the organ procurement procedure and the purpose and destination of tissues or organs removed. A debate is developing related to issues of rights to control tissue removed from the body without the consent of the deceased or their immediate family, and the harm that this action may cause relatives. Under the HTA 1961 (166) the individual gives consent for the removal of tissues for therapeutic, educational, or research purposes the exact nature of which are determined by the health care professionals involved. Recent news reports of the distress caused to relatives resulting from their failure to be informed as to the destination of their children’s organs has awakened fears that the medical profession may abuse their position as custodians of the organs afforded by the law. The public requires to be reassured that the powers invested in the health care professional to dispose of the body appropriately will not be abused and their loved ones body parts will be treated with due respect. 
To resolve some of this issues, guidance on the procedure to be adopted by the hospital authorities to adequately inform relatives of the organ donation or post-mortem procedure and establish any objection by the deceased and any surviving relatives is required. This would reassure the public and would assist hospital managers to exercise their duty under section 1(2) of the HTA 1961 (166). New guidelines provided by the Royal College of Pathologists (140) relating to the request to proceed to post –mortem examination and the appropriate steps required to ensure that relatives are adequately informed with regard to the procedure may hold implications for the requesting of organs for donation. This initiative to provide more information to the public and involve them in the decision making process regarding post-mortem examinations may go some way to restoring public confidence in their ability to control what happens to their bodies and those of their loved ones after death. This in turn may encourage more people to donate their organs and those of their loved ones.
 




Chapter 3 Presumed Consent Legislation

It has been previously suggested, that over the past decade in the U.K., despite the registration of an individual’s intention to donate their organs within the “Opting In” system, the gap between the availability of organs for transplant and the numbers of people awaiting a transplant continues to grow. This is despite the increased public knowledge of this procedure via the media and the increase in the numbers of transplant co-ordinator posts throughout the U.K. Many lives are lost each year which could have been saved had an organ been available for transplantation. Kennedy et al., (84) discuss that under the WHO (202) guiding principles, organs may be removed from a body of a dead person if :-

a)	any consents required by law are obtained 
b)	in the absence of any formal consent given during life, there is no reason to believe that the dead person would have objected to such removal. 

In most countries where the law and culture permit organ donation, organs are removed from cadaver donors as soon as possible after death has been pronounced. Unfortunately many people do not register their wish to be an organ donor or inform their nearest relative of their intention to do so. As a result many viable organs are lost every year. In an effort to meet this ever increasing demand for organs some European counties namely Austria, Belgium, Spain and France have changed their organ donation legislation to an “Opt Out” or “Presumed Consent” legislation. Before adopting this concept wholesale and amending the current legislation to facilitate this, it is important to analyse the claims made with regard to the implementation and success of presumed consent within these settings.

a) Adoption of Presumed Consent Legislation in Europe

Under this system it is presumed that everyone is in favour of organ donation and would wish to donate their organs in the event of their untimely death. Should they be of the view that they would not wish to donate their organs for personal or religious reasons, then they must register this objection or refusal of consent on a centrally held register. Differing interpretations of this concept have been adopted by different countries. Variations in the presumed consent legislation in different countries often reflect the religious, political and cultural views of that country and in the main fall into 4 categories:-

i) 	The strictest form of the law operates in Austria  (115) where organs can be removed provided that :
“In his or her life, the person concerned has not expressed an objection. The views of close relatives are not taken into account”
				Conference of European Health Ministers, (17)

Here relatives are not requested to donate the organs and their views are not taken into consideration.  Provided that the deceased has not registered an objection the organs are offered for transplant as soon after death as possible even if the relatives have not yet been made aware of the death.

ii)	In Belgium, Michielsen (109) suggests that a slightly more flexible version of this legislation is available where if there is no objection recorded from the deceased, the relatives are allowed to object to the organs being removed.  However, the medical practitioners involved in this decision are under no obligation to seek the views of the relatives. The relatives must initiate the process of refusing consent to the organ removal.  Roels (139) reports how Belgium was one of the first European countries to adopt this legislation in 1986 with the first register being established in 1987. 
iii)	In Italy, France and Spain organs can be removed once it has been ascertained that the deceased has made no indication that s/he objected to donation and relatives do not object. Drafting of the legislation here requires that the relatives be consulted to obtain information on the deceased’s wishes. Hors et al., (77) and Matesanz and Miranda (103) suggest that this system operates as a result of the strong religious views held within these countries
iv)	In Norway relatives are informed of the intention to remove organs for donation but the law only requires the consent of the nearest relative to proceed to donation (200).

b) Evaluation of Presumed Consent Legislation Success

Some commentators question whether these changes in legislation have increased the availability of organs for transplant. Kittur et al., (88) suggest that in the years since the “opt out” legislation was enacted, Belgium has seen a 119% increase in organ donation. New et al., (115) acknowledge how in 1987 Belgium did see a significant increase of 37% more kidneys available for transplantation following the introduction of this legislation which can not be attributed to any other trend within the country. However, they note Belgium did enact presumed consent legislation in the middle of a period of growth in kidney transplantation across Europe as a whole. This might suggest that factors other than the enactment of this legislation influenced the rise in kidney donations during this period. New et al., (115) suggest that an increased effort to publicise organ donation during the debate on presumed legislation in Austria could have contributed to the reported rise in organs for donation at that time. However, the U.K. , Germany and the Netherlands, who at that time did not have presumed consent legislation did not experience similar increases in organ donation over this period. This would support Kittur and colleagues (88) who attribute the rise in organ donations to presumed consent legislation. Evidence provide by Michielsen (109) which reviewed the overall numbers of successful kidney retrieval in three different centres in Belgium, also suggests that following the enactment of presumed consent legislation, the numbers of organs made available for transplant did increase significantly. Kittur et al., (88) do however note that this legislation was not accepted readily by health care professionals who continued to hold ethical objections to the introductions of this legislation.

c) Alternative Rationale for Results

Other factors that may influence the numbers of organ donations include the number of potential organ donations and the approach taken to the implementation of presumed consent legislation. The number of potential organ donations is often linked to the mortality rate in a country from road traffic accidents. These incidents which often involve young healthy individuals, provide a supply of suitable organs for donation. Legislation that tightly controls these situations inevitably impacts upon the supply of organs. Deaths from road traffic accidents fell in the U.K. markedly following the introduction of car seat belt and motorcycle helmet legislation. The U.K. road deaths per million population (pmp) in 1990 were 94 pmp in comparison to Spain and Belgium who registered 230 pmp and 202 pmp respectively (28). Mortality rates related to deaths from intracranial disorders such as cerebrovascular accident or injury also influence availability of organs for transplantation. The OPCS population survey (119) and the UKTSSA (185) annual report would suggest a strong relationship between the population mortality rates from these events and the retrieval of organs for transplant. New et al., (115) suggests that population density and the advances in medical ability to resuscitate these normal “pools of potential donors” within a country has a direct effect on the supply of organs for donation. Over the past ten years in the U.K. changes in the management of patients who suffer trauma or cerebral insult have significantly improved survival rates for these patients (186). The combination of these factors may have a significant impact on the apparently poorer numbers of organs donated in the U.K.  However, New et al., (115) suggest that the reduced road traffic accident death rates within the U.K. is one of the most significant factors which result in low number of organ transplants undertaken.

Different approaches to the application of presumed consent legislation can also impact on the perceived success of this legislation. A recent report in the Journal of the American Medical Association (116) cites Spain as leading the world in organ donation since enactment of legislation there. Interestingly, Spain utilises a less strict form of presumed consent legislation in which the relatives are asked for permission to remove organs, despite the deceased having registered no objection to organ donation. New et al., (115) also highlights how Spain has the largest number of transplant co-ordinators in Europe. Their immediate availability and daily contact with the staff within these units may impact on the other health care professionals awareness of and success in the procurement of organs for donation. This may in turn produce an overall improvement in the success rates of organ donation within the region. This is perhaps why other countries with similar types of presumed consent legislation do not produce such a high organ donation rates. 

d) U.K. Views on Presumed Consent Legislation

In the U.K. where the consent of the person lawfully in possession of the body has been obtained, removal of organs can proceed subject to evidence of there having been an explicit objection made by the person before their death. This requirement of the law often requires that relatives be consulted in order to establish what his / her wishes were. In the course of establishing this, the right of the relatives to object on the deceased’s behalf is upheld. In the light of increasing gaps between the supply and availability of organs for transplantation there have been calls for presumed consent legislation to be implemented to resolve the crisis in the numbers of people waiting for organ donation. For the first time the ethics committee of British Medical Association supported calls for a system of presumed consent to be utilised within the U.K. (180) (6). Recent emotional news reports of a child dying while waiting for an organ transplant have fuelled to debate over this issue (7). Supporters of this approach are of the view that this system is acceptable under the present legislation since the HTA 1961 (166) allows the removal of organs from a corpse having no reason to believe that the deceased previously expressed their objection to this. Presumed consent legislation would provide an opportunity for people to officially register their objection to organ donation and perhaps reduce the amount of missed opportunities for organ donation that occurs every year. It has been suggested that presumed consent legislation would negate the need to contact relatives in the sudden death situation which might be time consuming and may adversely effect the success of a transplant (90). Kennedy et al., (84) agree, suggesting that removing the need to request organ donation from relatives at this distressing time would be beneficial to them and increase the success of organ procurement. They also suggest that this proposal allows for the appropriate recycling of organs, which in terms of medical and social utility is ethically acceptable ,benefiting society as a whole by preventing the waste of organs and providing a better quality of life for the recipient (s). 

Public opinion in Britain is divided however, as to the benefits of presumed consent as opposed to the problems it might produce. Research undertaken by the United Kingdom Transplant Co-ordinators Association (183) suggests that 40% of transplant doctors are in favour of presumed consent legislation. In the early 1990’s three major surveys were commissioned to explore public reaction to this proposed change in the legislation. The OPCS  survey (120) suggested that 40% of those questioned were in favour of presumed consent legislation, 48% were against, with 12 % having no view. The RSGB study (137) undertaken on behalf of the Department Of Health , demonstrated similar results finding that 46 % of those surveyed were in favour of the proposal with 43% against and 11% didn’t know. In these surveys the subjects were asked whether or not they were for or against the new presumed consent proposal. Finally, in a similar study undertaken by the British Kidney Patients Association (58) reported that 60% of those surveyed were in favour of presumed consent with 30% against and 10% did not know. Further analysis of these studies produces some interesting conclusions. New et al., (115) suggest that the wording of the question in the BPKA survey which focused more on the use of the organs rather than the implications of the proposed presumed consent legislation may have influenced the outcome of the study. Similar surveys of popular opinion in relation to presumed consent legislation have also been undertaken in other countries. In the U.S. Kittur et al., (88) report that 39% of respondents to a questionnaire were in favour of this proposal with 52% against presumed consent legislation. In Holland 24% of respondents were in favour of a change to presumed consent with 75% wishing to retain the currently utilised system of “opting in” (89). 

Opinion on the need to change current legislation in order to improve organ donation rates is clearly divided. Organ donation relies heavily on public support and co-operation for its success. Critics of the presumed consent proposal (53) (149) (46) suggest that adoption of this proposal would be counter productive to the quest to improve organ donation. Mason and McCall-Smith (102) are concerned that this move may incite a backlash from the public in the form of reduced organ procurement rate as witnessed in Brazil following presumed consent legislation (22),  urging that people should not feel as if they are state owned commodities nor should their relatives be alienated by forced introduction of presumed consent legislation.

The analysis of the adoption of presumed consent legislation produces a number of key observations. Firstly, research undertaken to evaluate the success of this initiative by Kittur et al., (88) and New et al., (115) would suggest that the introduction of presumed consent legislation does appear to have produced an increase in the supply of organs for transplant. The exact source of this success remains unclear. Critical appraisal of these statistics reveals that there exists other variables which may have influenced the success of this initiative in improving the supply of organs for transplant. For example, the adoption of this legislation in a variety of formats in countries across Europe makes evaluation of its success difficult to assess and perhaps masks the true extent to which presumed consent legislation can successfully improve the supply of organs for transplantation. In countries that combine presumed consent legislation with a policy of confirming no objection of the deceased or the relatives by highly trained personnel, the rates of successful donation are highest. This may have an effect on the outcome. The key to the success rate may lie in the skill of the request and not the legislation. The impact of mortality rates which result as a consequence of head injuries or multiple trauma combined with the provision of a programme of public education of the need for organ donation prior to implementation of the legislation, may have also influenced the numbers of organs available for donation. Further research into these different variables is required to establish their impact on the overall clinical success rates attributed to presumed consent legislation before it can be said with certainty that the legislation is the key to improvements in the supply of organs.

Other claims made in support of this proposal suggest how this initiative facilitates social and medical utility in that it allows recycling of organs, which not only benefits the individual recipient, but also reduces the demands placed on the health services. This may be viewed as an appropriate use of the resources. While it may be realistically predicted that this would be a desirable outcome of the presumed consent legislation, exact statistics to support the theory that presumed consent impacts on the overall efficiency of the health services is unavailable. Supporters of the proposal also suggest that the presumed consent legislation facilitates the achievement of the wishes of the deceased, in that provides the individual an opportunity to register their intentions prior to their death. A review of the literature has not revealed any studies of the surviving relatives to support the claim that under presumed consent legislation, the last wishes of the deceased had been fulfilled. 

The true success of presumed consent legislation in the increase of organs for transplantation is therefore difficult to establish. Detailed evidence to support the claims made in its favour are limited. Perhaps the claims made in support of the initiative are premature. More research into the merits of this legislation may provide better insight into its function and success in the supply of organs for transplant.




Chapter 4 Objections to Presumed Consent Legislation

Whilst the critics of the presumed consent legislation acknowledge the need to improve organ donation and that initiatives to achieve this must be ultimately beneficial to society they suggest that this legislation presents a number of ethical and professional objections. These fall under the following groupings:

a) Respect for the wishes of the Dead

From a utilitarian perspective it may seem expedient and ethically correct to utilise all of the resources available to us to prolong lives, especially those of people who are chronically ill with no alternative treatment available. As the dead have no interests, it could be suggested that it is acceptable to recycle the corpse for the benefit of the living.  Chadwick (16) however suggest that the duties regarding the dead also involve the duties towards the living persons, for example, the next of kin who will have preferences as to what should be done with the corpse.

New et al., (115) also acknowledge respect for the corpse as being of symbolic importance to the relatives and part of the dignity required surrounding the dying process and death itself. Many cultures and religions, for example, Christianity, support the act of organ donation as being beneficial although some other religions, for example, Orthodox Jews and Japanese Buddhists, oppose organ donation being of the view that the whole body is required after death if their religious beliefs are to be respected. This may lead them not only to object to organ donation that would disfigure the corpse, but also refusing permission for autopsy after death for the same reason. Chadwick (16) argues these views cannot be discounted although acknowledges the consequentialist view that the corpse cannot be harmed by removal of organs for donation and the benefits gained by organ donation would outweigh the distress caused to the relatives. Harris (70) supports this position suggesting that if we view the need to carry out an autopsy against the relatives’ wishes as being acceptable, then it is irrational to allow the relatives refusal of consent  to organ donation to prevent the retrieval of much needed organs. Society overall, it is suggested, would benefit if we could accept the concept of routine salvaging of corpses. Presumed consent legislation it is argued would open the door for this situation to come into being. 

Wilks (197) and Ellis (46) argue even if the intention to implement presumed consent legislation was publicised, many people may not register their objection to this option. Concerns are particularly related to those within society who may not be able to register their objection due to lack of understanding of the procedure, incapacity through learning difficulties or mental health problems or communication difficulties. These groups are viewed as being most vulnerable to abuse under this legislation. There is some merit in this argument in that in general the public response to any request to register an opinion on a topic is often poor. Research suggests that presently we are unable to achieve little more that 70% of the public to register a vote at a general election even after exhaustive campaigning from the politicians. Gill and Hulatt (63) suggest that between 70 –90% of the public in the U.K. are in favour of organ donation however only 8 million of a population of 56 million, have transferred that enthusiasm into recording their intention officially on the NHS organ donation register. This would suggest that on the whole, the public are not good at registering support or opposition to an issue. It can be concluded therefore that many members of the public would fail to register an objection to organ donation should presumed consent legislation be implemented. In so doing they would loose their right to object and automatically become organ donors in the event of their death. 

 In addition, Lamb (93) and Kass (82) are of the view that to remove organs without consent or consultation with the relatives would be to disregard the wishes of that person and to regard the disposal of their remains as unimportant. This they see as treating with contempt the individual right to determine how the individual wished their remains to be disposed of. Most people in society acknowledge some form of spiritual requirement which even if not felt before, is often acknowledged at the time of their death. Great significance is placed by society upon the symbolic care of the corpse after death. Lamb (93) and Kass (82) suggest that part of the symbolic ritual of death is related to how we are cared for immediately after death. Although the corpse is no longer the man or woman, they suggest it represents the person and must be treated with respect. This includes the process of preparation of the body and disposal of the remains. Some particular religious groups e.g. Muslims and Orthodox Jews have particular rituals surrounding the care of the body following death that must be observed.  These opponents of presumed consent fear that should this legislation be enacted, these deeply held beliefs surrounding the care of the dead body would not be observed which would not only be disrespectful to the deceased but may result in considerable offence to the remaining relatives. 


b) Respect for the Autonomous Choices of the Individual

 Traditionally, although there has never been a legal obligation to donate organs, donation has been viewed as an act of giving (56). Dorell (35) in a government statement reiterated the view that there is no obligation to donate nor can there be a claim on the organs of an individual stating that:-

“We must accept that nobody has a right to anybody else’s organs. If something untoward happens, our organs may be of value to someone else but that should be the result of an altruistic decision about how we want our bodies to be used when we die. It should not be as a result of a right of the recipient…… It is the responsibility of the living whose organs may be of use to someone else; it is not anyone else’s job to claim the organs”


It is suggested that society as a whole, save particular religious groups, supports in principle the practice of donation of organs to help others after death, by the individual’s beneficent autonomous decision to register as an organ donor. In so doing the person freely gives consent to the use of their organs, this providing social and medical utility. Chadwick (16) suggests that since the mid –twentieth century the autonomy model of health care had been dominant with the respect for the patient’s autonomous choices being at the centre of health professional ethical philosophy. Dunstane (39) supports this view highlighting that organ donation is by active consent. Lamb (103) proposes that loss of autonomy in the power to make this decision is one of the major objections to routine salvaging of organs from corpses. The moral argument raised here is that in respecting what autonomous individuals have chosen what should be done with their bodies after death, we uphold the principle of respect for all the autonomous choices of other individuals. 

Some commentators take an even stronger view of the implications for society of presumed consent legislation. Erin and Harris (48) state that in their view presumed consent is no consent at all and it is disrespectful of the autonomy of the deceased to presume that they wish to donate. Fabre (53) questions whether the absence of an objection can be viewed as a statement of consent. Overall the view is that presumed consent legislation has the potential to reduce the deceased to no more than a collection of organs which should be utilised for the good of society and treated as a means to an end i.e. the supply of organs to others. 

Kass (82) suggests that presumed consent legislation is a form of coercion and infringes individual civil liberties. Erin and Harris (48) agree and are of the view that the fundamental right of the individual to make an autonomous choice to donate or withhold their consent to donate their organs is enshrined in the “opt in” system of registering the intention either by carrying a card,  or the individual consciously placing their name on the donation register. They suggest that we have a duty to respect the wishes of the individual. Supporting the view of Lamb (93) , Ellis (46) and Hill et al., (73) repeat the warning that erosion of this right by default under presumed consent legislation may in due course, impact on other rights to autonomous informed decision. This may create a “slippery slope” to people feeling that they are state owned commodities with little autonomy. 

Ellis (46) however does acknowledge the positive aspects of the presumed consent legislation and society’s duty to make available organs for life saving treatments, the duty that the dead owe to the living and is morally the correct thing to do. He fears however that the application of this concept in its present form could alienate the public and have a negative effect on organ donation rates. Moreover, he suggests that presumed consent proposals articulate society’s view that it is acceptable to do with the body what we feel appropriate where the person has not consented to prior to their death. The moral debate with regard to presumed consent legislation continues.

c) Trust in the Health Care Professional

The gift exchange theory first described by Mauss (104) suggests that the act of giving is structured by a set of societal norms, these being an obligation to give, to receive and repay.  The recipient is under an obligation to repay the gift by giving something of equal worth usually by acknowledging the gift and agreeing to care for the organ appropriately. He suggests that organ donation is governed by the same norms. Sque & Pyne (150) view the health care professional within this structure as the gatekeeper, who must optimise the patient’s chance of survival and care for the quality of life of the post transplant patient. Another obligation enshrined within this role is to achieve the process without social or psychological harm to the donor families, the recipient and significant others. This involves the screening of potential donors, the selection of the recipient and initiating the transplant process. 

Fabre (53) holds that the discussion with the relatives and the gaining of their consent to proceed to organ procurement is vital as it ensures the wishes and the best interests of the deceased are respected. He rejects Kennedy et al., (84) view that the introduction of presumed consent legislation would relieve the grieving relatives of the burden of decision making, suggesting that the action of removing such decision making powers would be morally degrading. He fears that the introduction of presumed consent legislation might have a detrimental effect on organ donation in the U.K.  Mason and McCall-Smith (102) agree with this view, concerned that a change in the present legislation may cause the public to wonder if in some cases death has been pre-empted and a certain form of organ husbandry has been developed. This may cause the public to lose trust in the health care professional to make an unbiased decision, resulting in long term damage to the relationship of trust between the public and the health care professions. The impact of such a break down in trust between the health care professional and the public can only be speculated upon. However, it is not a situation that is beyond the boundaries of possibility and requires careful consideration before changing any legislation that may alter the public’s perception of and trust in the health care system.
d) Harm Caused to the Relatives

In the event of a sudden death the duty of the health care professional is three fold. The U.K.C.C. (182) identify that the professional has an obligation to care for the dying person to the best of their abilities and ensure that even in death, no act or omission results in the detriment of their patient or client. The second duty of care is owed to the relatives and friends of the deceased in that their physical, spiritual and psychological needs are also met. Thirdly, the professional has a duty to utilise the resources of the health care system in the most efficient manner to gain the best outcome for society. Balancing these three competing obligations can often provide dilemmas for the staff involved. Wellesly et al., (193) and Cansdale & Cansdale (13) support the requesting of organ donation from grieving relatives in the event of a sudden death within the emergency department. Whilst acknowledging the need for staff education to carry out this role they encourage Accident and Emergency (A&E) staff to consider this option in the event of a sudden death. Finley and Dallimore (55) support this view suggesting that the option of organ donation may assist the relatives to begin the grieving process and therefore come to terms with their loss.

Kubler –Ross (92) and Parks (122) discuss the reactions to sudden death and the stages of the grieving process that bereaved relatives experience in this tragic event. They suggest that patterns of grief can be influenced by the support provided at the time of the sudden death. Phillips and Beaty (124) state how the timing and the method adopted for a discussion regarding organ donation is vital if the family’s needs at this time are to be respected. McDonald et al., (105) in reviewing the care and support of relatives in the emergency situation discuss how new standards of care for these individual have now been developed aimed at assisting them through the initial critical hours of the grieving process which occur following a sudden death.  Niles and Mattice (117) suggest that it is inappropriate to inform the family of the sudden death and request the donation of the organs at the same time. They cite research by Kozlowski (91) who suggests that the families require to acknowledge the death before they are approached with regard to organ donation. Opponents of presumed consent legislation raise concerns as to how this approach may impact on the bereaved. It is suggested here that to rush to obtain organs for donation might be detrimental to the grieving process for the family. Garrison et al., (60) suggest that consent rates for organ donation could be improved from 18 to 60% if there was a delay between death and the request for donation. Cutler et al., (23) concur with this view concluding that the de-coupling of the request for organs from the news of the death can be beneficial to donor rates as well as allowing time for the relatives to adjust. This they suggest will reduce the distress to relatives and ensure that the decision made is the correct one for the relatives, a decision that they will not regret later. 
These arguments would suggest that the difficulty within arguments in favour of a time delay for the relatives to come to terms with their loss before they consider the option of organ donation, lies in the limited time available between the death and the deterioration of organs. Staff in a sudden death situation have to balance the competing interests of the grieving relatives and the optimum condition of the organs for transplant. Kass (82) suggests that this may possibly induce harm to the relatives if they are not allowed time to grieve. To professionals working in this area this would be morally unacceptable.
 
In response to this difficult situation, Light et al., (97) acknowledges how relatives are often unable to cope with the decision making process. They suggest rather than remove the ability to consent or refuse organ donation from relatives, it is more appropriate to appoint an individual to advocate for them at this crucial time. To resolve this problem Light et al., (97) provide a system where family advocates will support and assist the bereaved to make an informed choice regarding their relatives organs. Light et al., (97) suggest that this facility has increased the consent rates in this situation. 

It can be concluded that there are many relevant objections to presumed consent legislation which as yet remain unresolved. Not least is the accusation that vulnerable groups such as those with communication problems, incapacity, learning difficulties or those unable to comprehend the legislation would possibly be open to abuse from this proposal. These individuals and others who are not in a position to express an objection may also fall foul of this change in the law unless special facilities within the legislation identified and excluded these groups of individuals’ from having to register an objection. How an accurate register would be established of individuals who are excluded for presumed consent and those who may register an objection to organ donation is not clear. Currently other countries utilise a central register which is facilitated via post offices or local government centres. The validity and reliability of this information at any given time is questionable. 

Advances in technology, for example, utilising computer data bases which could be accessed by the professional and public may provide an up to date central database listing individuals who object and those who are automatically exempt. There are financial and operational implications of this option that would require government funding and administration. Responsibility for the development of such a register has yet to the considered. However,  it could be reasonably concluded that this would be logistically difficult to achieve requiring a review of the latest population census and a survey of all the individuals who would be considered exempt e.g. those with mental health problems, those with learning difficulties, those who do not speak English as a first language and those who are below the age of consent. These people would automatically be exempt form the legislation and require to be recorded as such. Even if this data could be collected, a regular system of updating would require to be developed to maintain a “live” register. The strategy to achieve this has as yet not been developed.

Other objections to presumed consent relate to the perception held by many that the donation of an organ is an individuals’ most precious gift and the voluntary donation of these to be an expression of the altruistic bond between one human and another. The introduction of any legislation that makes the voluntary donation of an organ into a state commodity, available to be taken as a resource would change the relationship between the individual donor and the recipient. Professionals working within the hospital settings where presumed consent would be applied i.e. ITU and A&E departments raise genuine concerns regarding the practical application of such a proposal and the implications for their practice. To date little research exists which discusses the impact on the professional or the relatives involved in the procurement of organs for donation utilising presumed consent legislation. If organs were procured via this method and the lack of an objection to the procedure was confirmed later by the next of kin, the relatives and staff could be happy in the knowledge that the wishes of the deceased had been respected. It can only be speculated that if organs were removed from an individual whom it was subsequently found to hold an objection to organ donation both the relatives and staff involved would be harmed considerably. This would surely hold implications for the organ donation programme and may even reduce the numbers of people who offer their organs for donation as reported by Patel (123) and Csillag (22). 

There are clearly ethical, educational, manpower and organisational implications of such a system. To some the introduction of presumed consent legislation is unthinkable at this present time, as the public is inappropriately informed or not willing to address the implications of this proposal to address the organ donation shortage. Others suggest the introduction of this type of legislation despite its difficulties may paradoxically present less ethical and logistical problems than the other initiatives discussed. Any proposed legislation would require be practicable, provide protection for those most vulnerable in society, and yet offer appropriate opportunity for the professionals involved to identify those people willing to donate.
While the debate on these issues continues, some health care professionals are attempting to resolve the deficit in organ donation by developing alternatives to presumed consent legislation. The next chapter will explore these alternatives to presumed consent legislation comparing and contrasting their feasibility with this proposal.


Chapter 5 Alternatives to Presumed Consent Legislation

Alternative approaches to improve the supply of organs for transplantation include:-
A. Live Donation

In this situation the living individual donates an organ for transplantation. This may be in the form of regenerative tissues, for example, blood or skin or non -regenerative tissues e.g. a kidney. With the advent of drugs that will suppress immune reaction to transplanted organs, the use of non-regenerative organs from live donors is becoming increasingly common. Section 2 of the HTA 1961 (166) provides:-
2 (1) Subject to subsection (3) below a person is guilty of an offence if in Great Britain he :

a)	removes from a living person an organ intended to be transplanted into another
 person or

a)	transplants an organ removed from a living person into another person unless the person into whom the organ is to be or, as the case may be, is transplanted is genetically related to the person from whom the organ is removed 

2) For the purposes of this section a person is genetically related to:-

a)	his natural parents and children
b)	his brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood of either of his natural 
patents; and
    c)    the natural children of his brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood or of 
          the brothers and sisters of the whole or half blood of either of his natural 
          parents; 
          but persons shall not in any particular case be treated as related in any of those 
          ways unless the fact of the relationship has been established by such means as 
          are specified by regulations made by the secretary of state.





a) Consent to Live Organ Donation

Regulation of live donations in the U.K. lies both in common law and in statute.  In common law the first issue considered is that of valid consent for such an action and establishment of the individual’s legal right to donate tissues while alive. Mason and McCall- Smith (102 suggest that live donation is generally governed by the principle that no person capable of consenting to organ donation should be killed or seriously injured by this action. It is not permissible to donate an organ if this will mean the serious detriment to the health of the donor, much less lead to the death of a donor e.g. donation of a heart. There is always therefore the need to balance the risk to the donor against the benefit to the recipient when considering the legality of a live donation. That notwithstanding, a number of other issues relating to live donation emerge. 

Mayhem or “maim” is the crime of intentionally and maliciously maiming or disfiguring a person. Dukeminier (38) suggests that the question to be addressed is whether the removal of an organ for transplantation such as a kidney can be described as mayhem. The Law Reform Commission of Australia (170) suggested that English common law offers no set rule on this issue. On reviewing Human Tissue Transplants, the Commission noted little case law on which to base their decisions and related their decisions on transplantation to the ancient common law of “maim.” They suggest the more acceptable view, that surgery amounts in law to assault and battery. Under common law the removal of an organ from the live donor as with any surgical operation, principles of assault apply requiring the patient to give valid consent to the surgery and in so doing prevent an action being brought against the surgeon. Both Lord Devlin (29) and Lord Justice Edmund-Davis (42)  have supported this view in the U.K. 
Some have taken a different approach. Professor Daube (24) suggested:-
“An operation should be treated as a positive, beneficent, admirable action from the outset, not as a lawful infliction of harm. It is a cure, and only where essential elements are lacking in a situation does it become wrongful. After all, we do not construe marital…..intercourse as rape licensed by virtue of consent.”


This would suggest that if consent has been given any operation is deemed beneficial and lawful. This is not the accepted view however and surgery can be viewed as an assault if undertaken without the patient’s consent or outwith the accepted view of reasonable treatment for a patient. Assault amounts to tort, or civil wrong giving rise to a claim for damages. Assault can also be a crime punishable by law. Normally if the surgeon has gained appropriate consent for the procedure from the patient, this is sufficient to justify or defend an action for assault when consent has been properly given by the individual who has the legal capacity and competence to do so. However, there is a limit to the extent to which consent decriminalises the infliction of harm. As held in R v Brown [1993] (127) if the action consented to is considered to be in breach of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (173), then the consent is invalid. Dworkin (40) in discussing the law relating to organ transplantation in England and in particular consent to live transplantation highlighted four conditions that must be satisfied before any surgery could be legally acceptable: -

(i)	the patient must give full, free and informed consent
(ii)	it must be expressly for the patients benefit
(iii)	there must be lawful justification
(iv)	the operation must be therapeutic

Generally the operation must be performed by a person with appropriate medical skills. Within the contest of organ transplantation Dworkin (40) also suggests that the legality of live donor transplantation lies within the satisfaction of the first three conditions. However, he debates the question of whether the removal of an organ from the donor can be considered therapeutic or beneficial to him / her, so that in fact there is lawful justification for the procedure. In the situation of organ donation although the operation is not beneficial to the patient, the consent given by the donor to the operation would prevent a successful action for trespass by the donor. This view is also supported by Edmund-Davies LJ (42). 

It is arguable in law however whether taking an organ, for example, a non- regenerative one such as a kidney is normally viewed as a lawful operation i.e. it is of benefit to the patient.  Kennedy and Grubb (86) agree, suggesting that to validate consent it is enough that the operation to remove an organ does not seriously harm the donor despite the normal notion that any medical treatment to be lawful should be in the patient’s best interests. In this situation whilst there is clearly no physical benefit to the donor to remove a healthy kidney, there may be a benefit psychologically or socially if the donation of the organ improves the health of a close member of the donor’s family. It could also be argued that if this was the autonomous choice of the donor, then respecting his / her wishes could be viewed as a beneficent act. This resolves the difficulty of satisfying Dworkin’s (40) fourth condition in that it is accepted that the removal of the organ is not performed for the benefit of the donor, however the benefit to the recipient outweighs the potential harm caused.


b) Validity of Consent

A second issue worthy of consideration is the validity of the consent given by the live donor. Dworkin (40) questions the voluntary consent provided by the donor. The Law Commission (169) supported Dworkin’s view that the volunteer donor should be treated as the courts would view a rescuer i.e. that even if there is a recognisable risk to the donor, there was just cause or good reason to remove tissue or organs from live donors. Once valid consent has been obtained the English courts now generally view as lawful the operation to remove organs for transplant from live donors. Normally under these circumstances provided adequate consent has been obtained utilising the recognised procedures, no action will be raised against the surgeon for assault or battery. 

Questions of the validity of the consent however could arise related to the quality and quantity of information provided to the donor regarding the risks and benefits of the operation. Potential problems may arise related to intentional or unintentional coercion of the donor to consent, especially if the donor and donee are related. Many live transplants are undertaken between genetically related individuals with close emotional bonds. In this situation if the medical staff were in any doubt as to the validity of the consent whey would be legally and professionally obliged to determine the donor unsuitable for the procedure under the Unrelated Live Transplant Regulations Authority (ULTRA) (167) guidelines. These were established under the Human Organs Transplants Act 1989 (165). Practical difficulties such as the unavailability of a family member suitable to donate often impede this option. When live donation of organs between family members is undertaken the health care professionals involved are charged with the responsibility of assessing the validity of the consent given by the donor. This task is not without its professional and ethical dilemmas as the medical staff attempt to balance the desire to aid the chronically ill patient and recognise the pressures on the individual donor to resolve the problem by sacrificing his or her organ. 

Elliot (44) suggests that bioethical literature has also overlooked the question of competent people consenting to procedures that are risky or even harmful. He suggests that the vocabulary of rights and autonomy does not address complex relationship problems that arise between organ donors who are friends or family or the
recipient. Concerns have been raised that this option may result in abuse of individuals who may be coerced into donation of their organs due to family pressure rather than individual informed choice. In response Elliot (44) acknowledges that concepts of kinship, family expectations and obligations colour any decision made within these circumstances. For the medical professionals involved, live organ donation he suggests between a healthy donor to another, whilst being honourable, causes conflict between the principles of beneficence and respect for the autonomy of the donor. He questions whether it is appropriate for the doctor to encourage risks to the donor even if this is in another person’s interests. 

Another dilemma that can arise is that of the involvement of an incompetent family member who may be considered as suitable organ donors for a chronically ill sibling.
Elliot (44) highlights how bioethical literature of the past 30 years has attempted to explore the rights of competent patients to refuse treatment. In so doing it has struggled to resolve the dilemmas of subjecting patients who are incompetent to consent to research and risky procedures as in Re Y (mental incapacity: bone marrow transplant) [1997] (136) and Re GWW and CMW [1997]  (133). In these cases it was held to be in the best interests of incompetent patients to donate bone marrow to a family member. These judgements followed from the application of the best interest test in England & Wales as held in F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] (52). Here the court held that the treatment proposed for this patient could be undertaken if it were demonstrated that the treatment was in her best interest. McHale et al., (107) questions whether donation of an organ could be considered as treatment in the true sense. The Law Commission (169) referred to a US court judgement in Strunk v Strunk [1969] (152) in which an incompetent sibling was allowed to donate a kidney to his brother based on the emotional harm which the brothers death might produce. The Law Commission held that donation by an incompetent adult may be possible. They advised however that in these circumstances court authorisation would be required in each case to establish the facts of the case before granting permission to proceed. 

Generally it is accepted that the primary ethic which underpins the Hippocratic Oath (Appendix III) undertaken by medical practitioner on qualification is “Prima Non Nocere” which translates to “first do no harm” (102). If the practitioner is to uphold this view then s/he must always balance the benefits of any treatment against the burdens that it might place on a patient. As with the judgement in Strunk v Strunk [1969] (152), it may be deemed by the court that the donation of an organ by an incompetent individual, may be beneficial to him / her in terms of the social or psychological gains in improving the health of a sibling. Under legislation developed by the Scottish Parliament The Adult with Incapacity  (Scotland) Act 2000 (156), permission to carry out treatment and research on an incompetent person can be obtained provided that the conditions detailed with in the Act are realised. Although this legislation does not specifically refer to organ donation as a form of treatment, the literature in this area would suggest that under certain circumstances it could be interpreted as such. In so doing the risk to the incompetent person must also be assessed against the potential gains for the recipient.

Nevertheless, it would appear therefore that within the U.K. an adult can give valid consent to the live donation of an organ for the purposes of transplantation, provided that the conditions for freely given consent can be established.

c) Utilisation of Live Donation

Records held by the UKTSSA (184) suggest that in the U.K., only small numbers of successful organ transplantation operations result from the donation of an organ from a live donor. Other countries however utilise this option more routinely, for example, Norway (115). Here the sparse distribution of population renders access to dialysis very difficult for patients with renal failure, and as a result live donation of kidneys between family members is considered a more favourable option despite the difficulties this poses.  In the US, transplantation of kidneys from unrelated live donors is on the increase to ease the rising shortage of cadaver kidneys for transplant. In 1998 4,038 kidneys and 67 livers were transplanted using this option (187).  Light, the director of transplant services in the Washington area cited in Porter- Esmailpour (96), reports the efforts of six transplant centres to address this problem, which include the use of organs donated by altruistic individuals who wish to help unknown and unrelated people who suffer chronic renal failure. The Washington Regional Transplant Consortium (177) operate a number of options which include:-

i)	Living Donor / Cadaver Exchange : This would give a transplant patient priority on the waiting list for a cadaver kidney if a non-matching relative donated a kidney to the general pool. This proposal alone is expected to boost organ supply by 10%
ii)	Paired Exchange : A brother who wishes to donate a kidney but cannot due to non -compatible blood typing. The donor and the recipient are matched with a pair in similar circumstances if a match can be established 
iii)	Altruistic Donation :  An individual offers his kidney with no specific recipient in mind.

Veatch of Georgetown University Institute of Ethics, chairman of the task force set up to review the proposals, suggests that these are feasible and ethically sound (190). He discusses, how previously, individuals who offered their organs for live donations were viewed with suspicion and were even considered as psychiatricaly ill. Veatch now reports how these views have altered and live donation is now being considered as a viable option. Many observers of this programme however continue to have concerns regarding the ethical issues which underpin these initiatives. 

In the U.K. only small the numbers of live transplantations are undertaken every year. The rationale for this is unclear, however the shortage of suitable donors, fear of the considerable difficulties which may be encountered, together with the outcry relating to the commercial sale of organs may influence the decision not to explore this option.

It can be concluded therefore, that despite the facilitation of this procedure by law live donation is not without considerable problems from organisational, ethical, emotional and practical problems. As a result of these difficulties this option does not currently provide a major solution to the problem of organ shortages. If these problems were to be overcome, this may be considered as a valid alternative to the introduction of presumed consent legislation,  providing as it does a means to obtain an organ for donation via an informed decision from a competent donor who is physically able to do so or an incompetent donor if the courts deem this to be of benefit to him / her socially.

B. Commercial Sale of Organs

Many people are opposed to the sale of organs even between consenting adults. They suggest that this may encourage commercial trade in human organs from some of the poorest members of society. This view has been supported at government level with the enactment of legislation to prevent the commercial trade in organs. In the U.K. The Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (165) and the WHO (201) medical treatment guidelines were established in the wake of the news that Turkish donors were being recruited to and paid to donate their kidneys to genetically and ethnically unrelated recipients. This provoked considerable condemnation and this practice was prohibited under the 1989 Act. Under the terms of this Act it is an offence to exchange money save legitimate expenses, or advertise for the purpose of organ donation. This Act clearly distinguishes altruistic donation of organs between a live donor and an identified recipient from the commercial supply of organs and attempts to protect the interests of those who would be coerced into donation of an organ, perhaps to relieve financial burdens that they may suffer. It is suggested that in this situation freely given consent may be impossible to attain and it is therefore prohibited under most health care professional codes of conduct. 
Wilkinson & Garrad (196) have also raised moral objections to this concept suggesting that to allow commercial trade in organs is to reduce the body to a commodity and degrade human life. This view has also been supported by legislation in the U.S. within the National Organ Transplant Act 1984 (172), which bans the commercial sale of organs on moral grounds. Caplan (14) also suggests a ground swell of opposition to this initiative by transplant professionals who foresee desperately ill people bidding against one another for a kidney or a liver. Scott (143) highlights the dangers of this type of transaction, not least the commercial and legal implications of body parts as commercial goods and therefore subject to legislation under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1994 (176). 

Others challenge this view suggesting that this prohibition can be viewed as unacceptable state paternalism. Harvey (71) suggests that it is possible for the commercial donor to make a reasoned decision to offer his organs to better his financial position. Guttmann and Guttmann (68) suggest that attitudes to the banning of commercial organ donation are changing and that this is becoming a viable option to the shortage of some organs. Overall however, most take the view that acceptance of this principle would allow the commercial traffic in organs to develop with unacceptable consequences (41). Currently the GMC (61) holds a particular view and has issued particular guidance on the matter.
“ In no circumstances may doctors participate in or encourage in any way the trade in human organs from live donors. They must not advertise for donors nor make financial or medical arrangements for people who wish to sell or buy organs…… Doctors must also satisfy themselves that consent to donation has been given without undue influence of any kind, including the offer of financial or material benefit”

In the U.K. the commercial sale of organs is illegal. The Unrelated Live Transplant Regulation Authority (ULTRA) via the Human Transplantation (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (167) ensures that any donation between unrelated individuals is made on humanitarian basis and not a commercial one. The Human Organs Transplants Act 1989 (165) states that:-

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that the prohibition in subsection (1) above shall not apply in cases where-
(a)	such authority as is specified in or constituted by the regulations is satisfied –
(i) that no payment has been or is to be made in contravention of section 1 above; and
(ii) that such other conditions as are specified in the regulations are complied with.
(b)	such other conditions as are specified in the regulations are complied with.
(4) The expenses of any such authority shall be defrayed by the Secretary of State out of money provided by Parliament.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.
(6) The power to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument.
(7) – (2) In this Act “organ” means any part of an human body consisting of a structured arrangement of tissues which, if wholly removed, cannot be replicated by the body.


This section of the Act clearly limits the any payments or expenses which are permitted following donation of organs to prevent the sale of organs. The Human Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations also state :-
3. (1) The prohibition in section 2 (1) of the Act shall not apply in cases where a registered medical practitioner has caused the matter to be referred to the Authority and where the Authority is satisfied  - 

(a)	 that no payment has been made or is to be made in contravention of contrary to section 1 of the 1989 Act
(b)	 that the registered medical practitioner who has caused the matter to be referred the Authority has clinical responsibility to the donor; and
(c)	 except in a case where the primary purpose of removal of an organ from a donor is the medical treatment of that donor, that the conditions specified in paragraph (2) of this regulation are satisfied.






Two main areas of concern arise from this concept.
a) Fears of Dangers to Humans

Xenotransplantation involves the development of other animal species (either primates or other transgenic mammals) to produce organs for transplant into humans. Mason & McCall-Smith (102) suggest that this form of organ grafting will stimulate the maximum immune reaction to the transplanted organ, commonly seen in differing levels in all transplants. Increasing sophistication in technology now means that these transplants are being viewed as a viable alternative to cadaver donation in humans. Vines (191) reports that in the U.S. surgeons are already transplanting brain tissue from foetal pigs to treat Parkinson’s patients. In addition, an American AIDS patient received baboon bone marrow, which sadly was unsuccessful. In an effort to increase the supply of organs for transplant, PPL therapeutics (a US /U.K. based biotechnology company) is attempting to develop transgenic pig hearts and kidneys which will then be trialed on human subjects (181). As a result of these developments, a government advisory group (174) within the U.K. was set up under the chairmanship of Professor Ian Kennedy to explore the ethical acceptability of xenotransplantation. Throughout their deliberations the group had to balance the proposed benefits of this initiative against the potential harm caused to the recipient of an organ procured from this source. This group wrestled with the range of issues produced by this initiative which included such questions such as the safety of these transplantations and the possibility of cross species infection. The recent reports of the link between BSE and Varient Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans (45)  (100) featured highly amongst the concerns of the committee. The committee agreed that further research was needed into methods of quantifiable risks posed by xenotransplantation of organs.

This view has been supported by a recent report from the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (78), where their Lordships took the view that recent BSE scares have caused fear and suspicion within society, especially the methods and motives of leading scientists. They describe a crisis of public confidence in science. The news of successful cloning of pigs for the purpose of developing organs for transplant will add further to the concern expressed by the public. In a recent NOP (114) survey, 69% of those questioned reported that they would like a freeze on the development of transplants of genetically modified animal organs for human xenotransplantation .


b) Harm to Animals

Another issue raised by  xenotransplantations is the harm caused to animals by humans’ desire to develop new supplies of organs revolves around the rights of animals.  Downie (36) suggests that the government advisory committee were of the view that animals do have some rights to have their suffering minimised and their welfare safeguarded, but that these rights must be weighed against the possible benefits to humans of this development. The group were therefore of the opinion that xenotransplantation was ethically acceptable. Downie (36) disputes this view on the grounds that animal suffering produced in the development of this initiative is unacceptably high compared with the benefits alleged for humans. In addition, he challenges the views of some philosophers who suggest that a higher moral status can be assumed by humans over animals. On this basis these philosophers accept the  suffering of animals to benefit humans. This view is also challenged by animal rights groups who view the exploitation of animals an unacceptable and campaign vigorously for the banning of research on animals to develop human medicines and treatments. 

c) Religious / Cultural Objections

Others may object to the use of xenotranplantation on religious or cultural grounds. Vegetarians, Muslims and individuals of the Jewish faith or Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, may consider this unacceptable as they hold various objections to consuming certain animals or utilising their flesh. Downie (36) also acknowledges that many people accept the consumption of animals as food, however they would reject the utilisation of animal tissue in this manner. He suggests that the use of animal organs may be considered “unnatural” in the sense that it is human artefact i.e. it is not a normal or natural addition to the human body. Utilising this perspective, objections to other artificial aids which are utilised within the body e.g. cardiac pacemakers are viewed as acceptable because these do not come from another animal source.  He also suggests that the new practices which involve the insertion of genes from one species into another and transplanting the resulting organs is profoundly different from previous medical developments and requires further consideration before we deem them ethically acceptable. The government has responded to these fears with the establishment of a body to oversee the development of xenotransplantation. The United Kingdom Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA) will function in a manner similar to that of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), in the development and co-ordination of government legislation and policy in this area. This body has declared a moratorium on all clinical trails of xenotransplantation until further research can be undertaken into these issues.






D. Elective Ventilation of Brain Stem Dead Patients

a) Definition of Elective Ventilation

Feest et al., (54) reported attempts in Exeter to increase the supply of organs for transplant. Utilising this approach, potential patients, who may be in irreversible coma usually as a result of a cerebral injury, are identified and transferred to the intensive care unit. Following a respiratory arrest, which often results from a catastrophic cerebral event, the patient is artificially ventilated with their relatives’ consent and brain stem death criteria performed on them as previously described in chapter 2. If the tests proved positive with the patient being confirmed as brain dead, the relatives were invited to donate the patient’s organs for transplant as soon as possible after death is pronounced.  This usually involved the patient being certified as dead, however cardiopulmonary support was continued until the transplant team could arrange an organ harvest procedure. This is commonly known as Elective Ventilation (EV) or non – therapeutic ventilation, as the ventilation provided is not for the benefit of the patient who has been pronounced dead. The intervention is provided solely for the purpose of preserving the organs for future donation. Feest et al., (54) report the highest rate of organ donation in the U.K. utilising this approach. 

b) Concerns Over Brain Stem Criteria

Despite the reassurance of  the acceptance of the brain death criteria by the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges (19), Hodgkinson (74) highlights how many medical staff find it difficult to accept the technical criteria for brain stem death. Schroeter & Taylor (142) report that in the U.S. the controversy surrounding the differing diagnosis of brain death has had a detrimental effect on donor numbers. Hodgkinson (74) suggests that some will not proceed to remove the organs for transplant until the ventilator has been disconnected and the electrocardiogram demonstrates loss of all cardiac activity. In some cases medical staff are advised to wait ten minuets after cessation of breathing and cardiac output before preparing to remove the organs . In addition, uncertainty about brain stem death criteria validity has reputedly produced fears within the public perception. Media attention via BBC programmes such as Panorama (12) cast doubt on the practice of applying the criteria effectively. In the three month period following these broadcasts there was a 19.1 % drop in the number of kidney donations. The Working Party on behalf of the Departments of Health (199) however rebutted these claims, unanimously supporting the view that the clinical criteria for the diagnosis of brain death was satisfactory. In an effort to address these fears Mason & McCall-Smith (102) propose that the declaration of brain stem death could be followed by the issue of a death certificate to the next of kin may allay some fears in this area. This would also address the requirement under the HTA  1961 (166) for the surgeon to

 “Satisfy himself by personnel examination of the body that life is extinct”.

Confusion and some controversy related to brain death criteria does exist. This factor may impact on numbers of patients identified as potential donors and elective ventilation considered.

c) Ethical Objections to Procedure





Shaw (146) suggests that two legal challenges to the elective ventilation procedure arise from the confusion surrounding the definition of death. In the first instance, the Exeter proposal Riad and Nichols (138), suggests that medical care of a patient is stopped , before he has been declared dead and secondly, the interests of the incompetent patient should not be placed at risk for the good of the living. Schroeter & Taylor (142) report how differing criteria for diagnosing death has caused much confusion in U.S. intensive care units attempting to procure organs for transplantation. To resolve this difficulty in the U.S. the Institute of Medicine (168) issued guidance on the establishment of death and protocols for the procurement of organs in elective ventilation. 
Price (125) supports Shaw’s (146) view that the legal meaning of death in English law is vague and gives rise to ambiguity. Price (169) also suggests that under English law death is brain stem death, however the law is unclear as to when death is pronounced. This could be when two sets of  brainstem death criteria confirm that there is no activity in the brain stem or when artificial methods of support are withdrawn and cardiopulmonary activity ceases.  In recent cases such as Mail Newspapers PLC v Express Newspapers [1987] (99): Re A (a minor) [1992] (132) and Airdale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] (1), it was held that brain stem death is death in a legal sense. This was one of the arguments utilised by supporters of the Exeter Protocol to justify the use of  patients for elective ventilation. They suggested that in the legal sense the patient was already confirmed as dead before they proceed to ventilate the patient. They could not therefore be accused of harming to the patient.

“ The procedure causes no harm to the patient as ventilation is instituted at the time of respiratory arrest which is the consequence of brain death… Therefore it is important not to institute elective ventilation before respiratory arrest”.

Riad and Nicols (138) therefore feel justified in their approach arguing that their practice is within the law. For elective ventilation to be acceptable and within the law, this specific sequence of events is required by the Royal College of Medicine (176). Although controversial, Lord Justice Browne-Wilkinson commenting within Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] (1) suggests that to prolong an individuals life with medical interference without his stated consent is a civil and criminal wrong constituted in an unlawful battery. If taken as a blanket statement this ruling would hold implications for health care workers who instigate life saving procedures without prior consent, for example, patients in emergency situations. Acknowledging this ruling lawyers for the Department of Health have now advised that elective ventilation is unlawful when prior to death, consent to this procedure has not been obtained from the patient (108). 

MacLean (108) however reviews the current opposition to elective ventilation and suggests that this could be ethically and legally acceptable if prior consent were given by the patient. This proposal however has incensed many commentators (144). They suggest that this advanced statement made by the patient to non-therapeutic ventilation in the event of brain death, would allow the health care professionals to delay death for a short time. Shaw (146) does acknowledge that this would cause no distress to the patient but finds the proposal unacceptable. 

Questions are raised however as to the quality of the validity of consent given by an individual who has little or no knowledge of the organ donation process. Lamb (93) suggests that the public on the whole are not well informed as to the process of organ donation and therefore may not be aware exactly what they are consenting to. In order to meet the requirements of an informed choice the public would require to be made aware of all these aspects of the procedure before adequate consent could be provided.  These issues would have to be addressed via a public education initiative, which may be fraught with difficulties. The concept of brain death is often difficult to grasp even for the health care professional. Strategies aimed at educating the public about elective ventilation would require detailed consideration and a very careful programme of delivery. If the acceptance of advanced directives was to be extended to this area utilisation of this option may be possible. Details of how the individual would record and review their consent to become an organ donor under these circumstances would require to be drawn up and publicised. This would entail considerable resource and organisational implications for the NHS and ultimately the government. If elective ventilation is to be considered as a viable alternative to presumed consent these legal implications would require review.

e) Financial Objections  

In addition to any ethical and legal objections which may be raised against this proposal there have also been questions raised as to the financial viability of elective ventilation as an option to resolve the crisis in organ donation. Doubts about the success of the transplant programme may have impacted upon the readiness to identify patients for elective ventilation and organ donation. Professionals and public alike continue to view the transplant programme as being experimental and with poor survival rates (115). This may result in an apathetic attitude to the identification of potential donors. McHale et al., (107) suggests that lack of intensive care beds and poor staffing levels impact on donor rates. Demand for intensive care beds may impact on the professional and public views as to the appropriateness of using these precious facilities for what they view as unproven treatments. With the exception of a sudden death occurring within an A&E setting, when brain stem death is confirmed prior to organ donation, the patient will need to be transferred to an intensive care setting and cardiac output and ventilation artificially supported. Observers have suggested that the recognised shortage of intensive care beds (144) prevents these beds being utilised for the purposes of organ donation.  These beds are often urgently required for critically ill patients who have a prospect of survival. Schroeter & Taylor (142) acknowledge the distress caused to intensive care staff by being asked to care for a patient who had been declared dead. This may add to the stress already placed on staff  who have to refuse live patients admission to the intensive care unit due to lack of beds or staff to care for the patient. The recent media reports of patients dying while being transferred over a hundred miles to an intensive care bed can only serve to fuel this argument. McHale et al., (107) and Mason & McCall-Smith (102) whilst agreeing that the removal of a patient in a deep coma to an intensive care unit is a matter for local health policy makers, do however, fear the backlash of the public in the use of intensive care beds in this manner. Documented pressures on intensive care beds (144) may result in the staff reticence to explore the possibility of organ donation amongst critically ill patients in intensive care. 

In addition to intensive care beds organ harvesting also requires access to operating theatre staff and resources. Some professionals highlight the lack of resources available to address the normal theatre lists and are of the view that it is inappropriate to utilise this resource for the purposes of organ donation, causing disruption to the normal congested theatre list. Accepting recent government and Health Care Trust reports that many operations have to be cancelled every year do to lack of theatre time, it can be concluded that this difficulty is likely to impact on utilisation of theatre time for organ donation and transplantation. Research to confirm or refute this suggestion in often unavailable. Some managers under pressure to balance their financial budget may take the view that this is an unnecessary expenditure with no tangible reward for their hospital. 

Organ donation and transplantation does incur a cost to the health care trust in terms of staffing costs and utilisation of equipment. As yet there is no mechanism within the NHS for trusts to recoup the expenses incurred when organ donation is undertaken. This is challenged however by Kennedy et al., (84) who suggests any costs incurred here for an individual trust must be weighed against the overall benefit, medical & social utility achieved by the successful transplant to the NHS longer term. It would appear that not all NHS trusts take such a utilitarian perspective when attempting to balance the annual financial reports. The question of resources in terms of ITU and operating theatre provision would require consideration if this option was to be developed. These problems notwithstanding, this is option could be developed within the current legal and ethical frameworks and if may produce a number of viable organs for donation if a financial strategy to address the potential increased costs to the NHS could be developed. 

Controversy therefore exists as to the appropriateness of elective ventilation as an option to resolve the crisis in organ donation from an organisational, ethical and legal perspective. For some, these problems that currently surround the use of EV are insurmountable in terms of the ethical dilemmas and perhaps the introduction of presumed consent legislation would appear less problematic. For others however, these difficulties are of little consequence in comparison with the ethical problems associated with presumed consent proposals. Currently this option is not utilised to address the supply of organs for transplantation.

E. Utilisation of Permanent Vegetative State Patients for Organ Donation





This proposal however has angered many commentators  (50) (3) who view this as a very dangerous suggestion which they feel perpetuates the misunderstanding between brain stem dead patients and PVS patients.  Engelhart (47) suggests that this proposal would be detrimental to the organ donation programme challenging as it does the Hippocratic oath that states:- 
“I will never give a lethal remedy”.





Setting aside any ethical objections to this proposal there remain some legal implications that have yet to be explored. The arguments discussed in relation to elective ventilation of patients and lack of consent also apply. The difficulties in achieving understanding in the professional and the public discussed in relation to Brain Stem Death and Elective Ventilation are pertinent here. The concept of PVS is also extremely difficult for the professional to understand and is currently disputed by some, therefore education of the public on this topic may prove impossible.  In the absence of a specific directive from the patient to utilise their organs to this effect this action could be viewed as assault. In addition, Jones (81) suggests that no proxy can authorise the medical staff to proceed to organ donation in this situation therefore no family member could provide consent. If this option were to be considered, prior consent of the individual would be required. In the current climate of lack of public knowledge and uncertainty relating to the diagnosis of PVS this appears impractical. In some respects this option is viewed as ethically unacceptable as presumed consent legislation and untenable. For others if the problem of the lack of public knowledge on PVS could be overcome this might be considered as an option. This might involve the same level of education required before introducing presumed consent and be economically non-viable.

F. Development of Transplant Co-ordinators Role

Kennedy & Grubb (86) suggest that it is a lack of medical experience in the diagnosis of brain stem death and requesting of organs for donation that results in loss of organs for transplant. This view is supported by Gore et al., (66). In an effort to address this problem Sells (145) suggests that there needs to be a radical review of the education of intensive care and other staff within the acute areas to improve their understanding and skills in requesting organ donation from relatives. 

One approach to this would be an increase in the numbers of organ transplant co-ordinators. These specially trained professionals, usually former transplant or intensive care nurses, support the professionals within the intensive care or other acute areas to identify the potential organ donor and request the organ donation from the bereaved relatives. New et al., (115) suggest that the unique system of provision of transplant co-ordinators at both regional and local hospital level which exists in Spain, may be more influential in the high levels of organ donation rates than the presumed consent legislation alone. Here the co-ordinator is not solely employed as a transplant co-ordinator but in addition practices within their own speciality e.g. doctor or nurse within intensive care / renal units. 

Currently within the NHS similarly trained staff are few in number and are often only available within the locality of a large teaching hospital with an organ transplant unit. It is suggested by Sells (145), that an increase in the numbers and availability of these professionals would result in an increase in the numbers of organs offered for donation as is reported to be the case in Spain. The provision of these personnel would require considerable resources both in terms of recruitment, training and financial remuneration. Developing these roles often results in the loss of these specialist nurses from an already over stretched critical care area to fulfil the role. In addition, the cost of providing these co-ordinators is currently borne by the individual trusts that employ these staff. There is no central funding scheme currently available to develop and resource these personnel. This option would therefore require considerable financial resources in addition to organisational re –structuring to make this viable.

G. Non - Heart Beating Donor

a) Organ Retrieval Procedure in the Emergency Setting

Hassan et al., (72) ; Magrath (98) and Sutherland (153) all report that utilising a system of early retrieval of organs following a sudden death within the Accident & Emergency setting can be very successful in the procurement of viable organs. These non – heart beating donors are pronounced dead within the A&E department and if no objection to donation is revealed or the deceased carries a donor card providing consent, organ retrieval is undertaken very soon after death. Nathan et al., (113) reports that the organ donation pool could be increased by 20 to 25% utilising this approach combined with in situ cold perfusion technique. This procedure involves the infusion of the corpse intra-peritoneally with cold perfusion fluid very quickly following cessation of resuscitation procedures in order to preserve the organs. This procedure adopted by Booster et al., (9) in the U.S. and Varty et al., (188) in the U.K. has been successful in procuring organs especially kidneys that would otherwise be lost. In some cases the deceased either carries a donor card or relatives are present and after being informed of a loved ones death, give permission for the procedure and the donation of the organs. This allows retrieval of the organs almost immediately without the need to take the patient to an intensive care bed if a theatre is available to harvest the organs. This procedure negates the requirement to ventilate the brain dead patient. 


b) Problems with of Obtaining Consent in the Emergency Setting

Many people die every year as a result of a traumatic or sudden event. Social surveys suggest that up to 78% of the population are willing to donate their organs after death however only 26% of people indicate this by carrying a donor card (59) (62). Large amounts of the population however, may not carry their signed donor card or have discussed their wishes with their relatives prior to their untimely death. Many organs that could be procured in these circumstances, are lost because their relatives are either not asked to give consent or refuse, worried that this is not what their deceased relative wished. Lack of knowledge of the deceased’s wishes combined with absence of consent from relatives often prohibits the donation of organs for transplant in the event of a sudden death.

Difficulties in obtaining consent in this situation have to be considered within the context of the sudden death within an A&E environment.  As previously highlighted some authors suggest that there is a potential for harm to be caused to relatives by requesting organs at this time. Wright (202) and Davies (25) citing the work of Corless, Germina and Pitman (21) highlights how the grief and mourning after a sudden traumatic death in the emergency situation is a very complicated affair. This is supported by Phillips and Beaty (124) who discuss 4 stages of intervention required in the sudden death situation to support relatives. Miles et al., (110) discuses the feelings of fear, hopelessness, despair and overwhelming sense of chaos that the grieving relatives appreciate when informed of their loved one’s death in the emergency situation. Stein (151) identified the difficulties for health care professionals of approaching grieving relatives in this situation to request permission to request cadaver organ donation. This supports Gore et al., (65) suggestion that in the sudden death situation up to 30% of families who were asked to donate their loved one’s organs refused, often because they did not know their family member’s wishes, or were too distressed at the time of the sudden death to consider this aspect.

 Lack of time to access and inform the bereaved relatives of the death and care for them appropriately prior to the request organ donation is a major issue of concern to the staff within emergency settings.  Erin and Bryant (51); Cooke et al., (20) and a joint report by the RCN A&E Association and the British Association of A&E Surgeons assessing the facilities for grieving relatives in A&E (158), have identified shortcoming’s within the A&E setting in the standard of care provided for these relatives. In responses they all recommended the introduction of standards and additional training for professionals in this setting to improve the care of the bereaved. Many organs are lost because the Accident and Emergency or Transplant team is unable to obtain permission from relatives in time to utilise the organ before the organ deteriorates. As previously discussed there is a limited time following cessation of circulation for organs to be usefully removed. 
 
Lack of appropriate preparation of staff in A&E departments may also hinder efforts to obtain consent for donation. Sells (146) highlights the specialist knowledge and training required for the health care professional to be successful in obtaining consent form the relatives within this distressing time. The separation of the communication of the death from the requesting of organs for donation  i.e. the de-coupling of these two tasks is recommended by Niles and Mattice, (117) if successful consent for donation is to be obtained. Sells (146) recommends access to a transplant co-ordinator in this situation. This specially trained member of the transplant team is ideally prepared to address the needs of the suddenly bereaved and provide the information and support required to obtain their consent to organ donation. Sadly, these professionals are in short supply and are usually only available within hospitals that have a transplant centre located within their facility. 

Schroeter and Taylor, (142) and Ehrle et al., (43) support this view reporting that lack of specialist training in this area and pressure to care for the surviving patients within the emergency setting, may mean that staff elect not to request organ donation from relatives at all. Wijne et al., (194) also report problems accessing relatives quickly enough to obtain consent and remove the organs in optimum condition however they suggest the 45 mins window of time between certification of death and damage to the kidney, may offer a solution to the problem. They suggest that this time provides an opportunity for the emergency department staff to address their professional and ethical obligations to respect the autonomy of the patient and relatives and yet still address their social utilitarian obligations by contributing to the supply of organs for transplant.
In contrast to these arguments put forward by emergency staff for the refusal to utilise the non-heart beating donor option in the emergency setting, recent reports suggest that utilising this option may not be so potentially harmful and distressing for the bereaved as first thought. Research undertaken by Finlay and Dallimore (55) related to relatives reactions to the sudden death of a child and personal accounts from Carsdale and Carsdale (13), suggest that the action of donating an organ for transplant may be beneficial in the long term to the response to a sudden bereavement.
It would appear that the utilisation of non-heart beating donor options in the emergency setting has considerable resource and educational implications for the health care professionals who decide to implement this scheme. The responsibility for the organisation or financing of such an option has yet to be established.

 c) Proceeding Without the Consent or Knowledge of Relatives

Given the difficulties in the accessing relatives and obtaining consent to donation in the sudden death event, supporters of the non – heart beating procedure (72) (98) (153) suggest that this procedure is acceptable in terms of the organs which can be obtained, even if the prior consent or objection of the deceased’s relatives has not been established. Hussain et al., (72) suggest that under the terms of the HTA 1961 (166),  in which only the permission of the person in legal possession of the body i.e. the hospital administrator is required to consent to organ donation, if a donor card is found within the deceased’s personal effects, it is acceptable to proceed with this option without the permission from the relatives.  They suggest that in the event of a time delay in accessing relatives, then the cannulae used to prepare the tissues could be inserted into the deceased and the cooling procedure commenced as soon as the person was pronounced dead. They also suggest that in the event of relatives refusing permission on their arrival then the procedure could simply be halted. They do not however report if the relatives would be informed if the procedure had been commenced prior to their arrival. In consideration of previous arguments raised surrounding the potential actions alleging unlawful interference with the corpse and harm to relatives, it is questionable however whether this practice is legally or ethically acceptable. 

From the legal perspective whilst the procedure is permitted under the terms of the HTA 1961 (166) provided that the hospital administrator has made reasonable efforts to contact relatives, in the event of a sudden death there is also a legal requirement under the Coroners Act 1988 (161) and the Fatal Accident and Sudden Death (Scotland)  Act 1976 (163), to inform the coroner or procurator fiscal and request permission to proceed to organ donation. Hussan et al., (72) and Sutherland (153) make no comment as to the measures required to address this issue.

Ethical questions are also raised by this option.  Emergency staff suggest proceeding to organ donation without first establishing the wishes of the deceased or the possible objections of any relative is in conflict with their obligations to respect the autonomous wishes of the deceased and care for the relative. As with the arguments highlighted in the discussion of elective ventilation of the brain dead patient, utilisation of the deceased in this manner as a source of organs may cause some disquiet. i.e. the deceased is being subjected to a procedure unrelated to the preparation of the body for burial, but for the good of the potential donee. 

Lewis and Valerius (95) highlight that in order for organs to be retrieved in a manner that is acceptable under codes of medical ethics, that the patient must make the transition to donor and that an acceptable time must elapse for death to be confirmed by asystole on the cardiac monitor. Only when this time has passed, usually 5 minuets, and the patient has no chance of auto resuscitation, can the patient be pronounced dead and organs removed (138). This also fulfils the requirements of the H TA 1961 (166) and the International Conference of Non Heart Beating Donation (168) to certify death before proceeding to organ donation. The resuscitation role and the organ retrieval role have also been traditionally undertaken by two separate teams to preserve the objectivity and legal / ethical requirements in this event. Lewis and Valerius (95) also take the view that in the event of a sudden death the emergency staff involved are required to act in the best interests of the deceased but also to adequately care for the relatives.  To allow the procurement of organs in the non- heart beating donor without evidence of consent is thought to be disrespectful to the deceased and in conflict with their obligations to the bereaved. 

While acknowledging that this procedure allows relatives to fulfil the last wish of a relative to donate, Lewis and Valerius (95) suggest that without prior consent, the retrieval of organs from the non-heart beating donor may raise concerns in the mind of the relative. They may wonder perhaps that in the haste to acquire organs for transplant as to whether all methods of resuscitation were exhausted by the emergency staff prior to the certification of death of their loved one.

The merits of a new development involving the use of non-heart beating donors who die suddenly in the emergency setting is currently being debated. Supporters hail this as a breakthrough in the fight to procure organs which would otherwise be lost while other commentators warn of the impact on the relatives of requesting and removing organs quickly in the event of a sudden death. Fundamental questions arise with this option however, such as the appropriate care of the bereaved in the emergency setting and the ethical implications of removing organs from cadavers before allowing the relative time to object. Research continues into this option and in time if the bereavement care support in the A&E department can be enhanced, this may provide a great source of organs for transplantation. 


d) Utilisation of Presumed Consent with Non – Heart Beating Donors

Supporters of presumed consent legislation (84) suggest the introduction of this concept would eradicate the requirement to obtain consent by providing concrete evidence of a refusal to donate from the deceased. A lack of registration would be taken to indicate a wish to donate. This legislation it is argued would remove the practice of asking relatives for consent to donate organs at this distressing time Kennedy et al., (84) suggest:-

“ A contracting out system has a moral benefit of relieving grieving relatives of burden of deciding about donation at a time of great psychological distress”

It is proposed that the introduction of this legislation would allow more efficient  procurement of organs from non-heart beating donors. The evidence presented here would suggest that A&E staff might challenge this view given that they place so much store by the requirement to honour their obligations not only to the wishes of the deceased but their requirements to support the relatives at this crucial time. The enactment of presumed consent legislation to facilitate non-heart beating donor option may hold major implications for the relationship between the emergency team with the public. Lamb (93) acknowledges this, citing the scenario of the relatives arriving in A&E not only to be told that their loved one has died suddenly, but in addition, his or her organs have already been removed for donation. This situation could only accentuate suspicions already held by the public regarding the power held by the health care community to determine their health and their access to care. This coupled with concerns related to lack of confidence in the scientific community (78), the utilisation of presumed consent and this technique may not only produce severe consequences for the trusting relationship required between the emergency staff and the public but could also be counter productive to the campaign to increase the amount of the public willing to consent to organ donation

In summary, taken together these seven major initiatives can provide a considerable number of organs for donation. Alas, the numbers that they provide are not enough to meet the demands of the organ transplantation programme. In 1999 1,860 transplants of solid organs were undertaken within the U.K. (184). It can be concluded that all of these initiatives to improve the supply of organs for transplant hold organisational and resource implications for the NHS. In most cases each option also involves a level of debate as to the organisational, financial legal and ethical implications of these initiatives. Taylor (156) amongst other suggests that these initiatives do not require changing but they do require resuscitation, perhaps with a review of their effectiveness, their funding and the structure which under pin them. What is clearly apparent is that none of these initiatives to improve the supply of organs could be successful in improving the supply of organs for transplant without considerable review of the philosophies and structures that under pin the organ donation system within the U.K. The effort required to achieve this aim in terms of the organisational, financial and educational resources may prove more complex than introducing presumed consent legislation, which itself would require careful drafting and administration. 






The aim of this work was to explore the legal, ethical and professional implications for the professionals, patients and relatives of any change to presumed consent legislation. On consideration of these issues two key options arise for the public and the professional to debate.

A. Continue with Present Legislation

As has been demonstrated during this work there are many criticisms of the HTA 1961 (166) in relation to its content and relevance to the practice of organ donation in the 21st century. Despite this criticism under this legislation there is considerable scope for the increase of supply of organs for transplant. Crucial within the provisions of this Act is the principle of the altruistic, non-coerced voluntary donation of an individual’s organs or tissues, for the benefit of his / her fellow human being. Another key practice although not legally required under this legislation but nevertheless held in high esteem by society and professionals, is the importance paid to the sensitivities and wishes of the relatives in any decision to proceed to organ donation. Should it be agreed that the principle of voluntary donation of organs contained within the HTA 1961 (166) should be retained, and such high importance placed on the wishes of the deceased’s relatives, then the current legislation could be redrafted to take account of these and the changing perspectives in health care that have emerged during the 39 years since the Acts implementation. This could allow the present legislation to be more effective. 

Notwithstanding the need to resolve the difficulties identified with the present legislation, evaluation of the current position in relation to the procurement of organs for transplantation demonstrates a lack of any coherent strategy for the application of this legislation. There appears to be a very haphazard structure in terms of the organisational, educational, financial, research and information systems that underpin the principles voluntary of organ donation contained within the HTA 1961 (166). This is not a situation that should be allowed to continue. Recent government strategy documents outlining the future plans for the nation’s health care (71) made no reference to the crisis in the supply of organs for transplantation. Should the legislation be retained in either its present or redrafted form then this deficit requires urgent action by government.

The critical shortage of the supply of organs for transplant together with the long term benefits for society must be placed on the government health agenda as a matter of urgency and force debate on these issues. A central authority should be established to explore the whole issue of the procurement of organs for transplantation. Within this authority’s remit should be the power to undertake an audit of the effectiveness of current strategies and best practices that will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of organ transplantation approaches already practiced. This authority should hold the power to identify financial and organisational strategies that have been demonstrated to be most appropriate for this purpose and draw up standards and guidelines for health trusts and health care professionals working within this speciality. Regular clinical audit of current transplantation initiatives should be mandatory.

B. Adoption of Presumed Consent Legislation

Alternatively, should the debate produce an agreement to adopt presumed consent legislation any framework developed to implement such an initiative would require to address the legal, ethical financial and professional objections to this legislation discussed previously within this work. The appropriate level and method presumed consent legislation best suited to the U.K. health care system would need to be debated and agreed. It is proffered that given these caveats the following framework may facilitate the adoption of presumed consent legislation within the U.K.

a) A government funded multicultural education programme aimed at informing the public of the merits and problems associated with presumed consent legislation together with information on how they would register their objection.

b) Following this education programme a national referendum to establish the support for a change in the legislation in favour of presumed consent.

c) The development of a body of experts within the field of organ transplantation similar to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to advise, develop and oversee the drafting and implementation of any new legislation. 

d) This authority would identify groups of vulnerable individuals e.g. those without the capacity or competence to understand the legislation and raise an objection, who would be automatically exempt from any new legislation. Given the acknowledged legal problems in the identification of individuals with incapacity, this may in itself prove very difficult to establish.

e) Drafting of new legislation that makes mandatory the removal of organs for transplantation by persons identified as having proper authority to do so unless a clear objection has been registered. Contained within this legislation would be the groups of individuals who are automatically exempt from this legislation.

f) Identification of penalties for non- adherence to the legislation together with any mitigating circumstances which would considered as due cause for non-observance.

g) Addition of a clause to the new legislation which would facilitate a conscientious objection for the professional who felt unable to adhere to the legislation.

h) Recognition of the possible harm to any recipient, staff and relatives under this legislation and potential legal actions which may result.

i) The development of guidelines designed to facilitate a successful claim for damages by any organ recipient or relative who could demonstrate harm suffered as a result of this legislation. 

j) A government funded compensation scheme to support any actions against health care trusts arising from the implementation of this legislation.

k) An update of the population census aimed at identifying individuals who would be exempt from the legislation.

l) A strategy to update this information on a regular basis utilising data from general practitioners, health authorities, departments of social work , mental welfare commission and any other bodies responsible for the care of vulnerable people in society.

m) The development of a communication strategy which would allow easy access to the central data register for the individual to register an objection and how they might withdraw this should they change their mind. This may include multiple methods of access including the written word, telephone and internet methods of registration.

n) The development of an information technology strategy which would allow access to the central register, for every major health care trust on a 24 hour basis.

o) The development of a programme of education and advice for health care professionals within the acute setting who may be directly involved in the implementation of the legislation.
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 Appendix 1 The Human Tissue Act 1961 , s 1 provides

1.	(1) If any person, either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness, has expressed a request that his body or any specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical education or research, the person lawfully in possession of the body after his death may, unless he has reason to believe that the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise the removal from the body any part or, as may be, the specified part, for use in accordance with the request.

(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the person lawfully in possession of the body of the deceased person may authorise the removal of any part from the body for use for the said purposes if, having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, he has no reason to believe

a)	that the deceased had expressed an objection to his body being so dealt with after his death, and had not withdrawn it; or

b) that the surviving spouse or any other surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt with.

(3) Subject to subsection (4) and (5) of this section, the removal and use of any part of a body in accordance with an authority given in pursuance of this action shall be lawful.

(4) No such removal shall be effected except by a fully registered medical practitioner, who must have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct.

	(a) No such removal  of an eye or part of an eye shall be effected except by
	a registered medical practitioner, who must have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct; or

(b)	a person in the employment of the health authority or the NHS trust acting on the instructions, be satisfied that the person in question is sufficiently qualified and trained to perform the removal competently and must either
(i)	have satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct; or
(ii)	be satisfied that life is extinct on the basis of a statement to that effect by a registered medical practitioner who has satisfied himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct. [Inserted by Corneal Tissue Act 1986].

(5) Where a person has reason to believe that an inquest may be required to be held on any body or that a post-mortem examination of any body may be required by the coroner, he shall not, except with the consent of the coroner

(a)	give authority under this section in respect of the body; or
(b)	act on such authority given by any other person.

(6) No authority shall be given under this section in respect of the body by a person entrusted with the body for the purpose only of its internment or cremation.

(7) In the case of a body lying in hospital, nursing home or other institution, any authority under this section may be given on behalf of the person designated for that purpose by the first management thereof by any officer or person designated for that purpose by the first mentioned person.
(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed as rendering unlawful any dealing with, or with any part of the body of the deceased person which is unlawful apart from the Act.

(9) In the application of this section to Scotland, for subsection (5) there shall be substituted the following section
“(5) Nothing in this section shall authorise the removal of any part from a body in any case where the procurator fiscal has objected to such removal”

2 (1) Without prejudice to section fifteen of the Anatomy Act 1832 (Which prevents that Act from being construed as applying to post-mortem examinations directed to be made by competent legal authority), That Act shall not be construed as applying to any post - mortem examination carried out for the purpose of establishing or confirming the causes of death or of investigating the existence or nature of abnormal conditions.

(2) No post-mortem examination shall be carried out otherwise than by or in accordance with the instructions of a fully registered medical practitioner, and no post-mortem examination which is not directed or requested by the coroner or any other competent legal authority shall be carried out without the authority of the person legally in possession of the body; and subsections (2),(5),(6) and (7) of section one of this Act, Shall, with the necessary modifications, apply with respect to the giving of that authority.

3.	The provisions to be made and the certificate to be transmitted under section thirteen of the Anatomy Act 1832, in respect of a body removed for anatomical examination may, instead of being provision for and certificate of burial, as mentioned in that section, be provision for the cremation of the body in accordance with the Cremation Acts 1902 and 1952, and a certificate of the cremation.







Appendix II Brain Stem Death Criteria and Testing

The Royal Colleges’ Statement (1979) identified three general conditions which have to be satisfied before brain stem death testing can be considered:-
1.	The patient is deeply comatose
2.	The patient is maintained on a ventilator because spontaneous respiration is inadequate
3.	There is no doubt that the condition of the patient is due to irremediable structural 
brain damage

If these conditions are satisfied then the following diagnostic tests for brain stem death should be undertaken:
	The pupils are fixed in diameter and do not respond to sharp changes in the intensity of light.
	There is no corneal reflex
	The vestibulo-ocular reflexes are absent (a test involving injecting ice-cold water into the ear and observing eye movement
	No motor responses within the cranial nerve distribution can be elicited by adequate stimulation of any somatic area
	There is no gag reflex or reflex response to bronchia; stimulation by suction catheter passed down the trachea
	No respiratory movements occur when the patient is disconnected from the mechanical ventilator for long enough to ensure that the arterial carbon dioxide tension rises above the threshold for the stimulation of respiration.

Source New et al., (1994)
Appendix 111 The Hippocratic Oath

“ I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygiea and Panacea, and I take to witness all gods, all the goddesses, to keep according to my ability and my judgement the following Oath:
“To consider dear to me as my parents him who taught me this art; to live in common with him and if necessary to share my goods with him; to look upon his children as my own brothers, to teach them this art if they so desire without fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons of the master who taught me and the disciples who have enrolled themselves and have agreed to the rules of the profession, but to these alone, the precepts and the instruction.  I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgement and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion. But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I will not cut for stone, even for patients in whom the disease is manifest; I will leave this operation to be performed by practitioners (specialist in this art). In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men, be they free or slaves. All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my art, respected by all men and in all times; but if I swerve from it or violate it, may the reverse be my lot. 
Source : Mason and McCall-Smith (1999)
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